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Temporary Securities Regulation
Anita K. Krug*
Abstract
In times of crisis, including during the 2020–2021 global
pandemic, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
has engaged in a type of securities regulation that few scholars
have acknowledged, let alone evaluated. Specifically, during
recent market crises, the SEC adopted rules that are temporary,
designed to help the securities markets and their
participants—both public companies and public investment
funds, such as mutual funds and ETFs—weather the crisis at
hand but go no further. Once that goal has been accomplished,
these rules usually expire, replaced by the permanent rules that
they
temporarily
supplanted.
Although
the
temporary-rulemaking endeavor is laudable—and arguably
necessary for the sake of maintaining well-functioning markets
in times of crisis—neither the SEC nor its observers have
sufficiently acknowledged the meaningful risks that temporary
rules might present to investors. At the same time, they have not
appreciated the opportunities that temporary rules may create
for furthering the cause of more effective regulation. This Article
seeks to illuminate the potential and the pitfalls of temporary
rules, thereby contributing to a better understanding of what is
at stake when the SEC adopts them and what considerations
should inform the agency’s rulemaking during future crises.

* Dean and Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author
thanks the Chicago-Kent Library Director, Jean Wenger, for excellent
research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
In May 2020, shareholders of the cruise operator Carnival
Corporation sued the company and its CEO in federal court,
alleging that the company made a number of misstatements in
the Form 10-K report it filed in January 2020 regarding the
occurrence of COVID-19 among passengers on its cruise ships
and its protocols on health and safety.1 Following this,
Bloomberg Businessweek’s and the Wall Street Journal’s
reporting on Carnival’s handling of the COVID-19 outbreak was

1. See Omnibus Order at 2–3, Serv. Lamp Corp. Profit Sharing Plan v.
Carnival Corp., No. 1:20-cv-22202 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 30, 2020), ECF No. 42
(describing the contents of Carnival Corporation’s January 2020 10-K report
and the subsequent news reports placing those contents into question).
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critical of the cruise line.2 Allegedly as a result of these events,
the company’s stock price declined by 16 percent.3
In August 2020, shareholders of STAAR Surgical Co., a
company that makes implantable eye lenses, sued the company
and its CEO in federal court, alleging that the company made a
number of material misrepresentations, including in the Form
10-K report it filed in late February 2020, the Form 8-K it filed
in April 2020, and the Form 10-Q report it filed in May 2020,
regarding its positive sales outlook and the impact of COVID-19
on its sales performance.4 These alleged misstatements were
followed by the company’s August 2020 Form 10-Q filing, in
which it stated that financial results for the second quarter were
disappointing, and a third-party report stating that fraud
pervaded part of the company’s business.5 Allegedly as a result
of these events, the company’s stock price declined by 16.2
percent.6
In September 2020, shareholders of Portland General
Electric Co., an electrical utility, sued the company and its CEO
in federal court, alleging that the company misrepresented its
financial performance for the first quarter of 2020 in its April
2020 Form 10-Q report.7 Shareholders further alleged that, in
2. See id. at 4 (noting that, in April 2020, the Wall Street Journal
published an article making allegations about Carnival Corp.’s role in
spreading COVID-19 and describing “early warning signs” that Carnival had
failed to disclose (internal citations omitted)).
3. See MICHAEL G. BONGIORNO ET AL., WILMERHALE, COVID-19: LESSONS
FROM THE SECOND WAVE OF SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS 4 (2020),
https://perma.cc/49VP-A6QR (PDF) (noting that Carnival Corporation’s stock
price declined by 4 percent after a business publication stated that the
company failed to adequately protect customers and another 12 percent after
the Wall Street Journal published its article on how the company “‘facilitated
the spread of COVID-19’”).
4. See Complaint at 7, 11–12, Alwazzan v. STAAR Surgical Co., No.
8:20-cv-01533 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2020) (detailing the company’s
misstatements in its required regulatory filings regarding its sales volume).
5. See id. at 14–19 (describing the disclosures in the Form 10-Q report
and the third-party report).
6. See id. at 15, 19 (noting that the company’s stock price fell by 10
percent following the 10-Q filing on August 5th and another 6.2 percent
following the dissemination of the third-party report on August 11th).
7. See Complaint at 5–8, Cannataro v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., No.
3:20-CV-01583 (D. Or. Sept. 11, 2020), ECF No. 1 (quoting relevant portions
of the company’s April 24, 2020, Form 10-Q report and an accompanying press
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its July 2020 Form 10-Q report, it understated certain risks
associated with its business.8 The alleged misstatements
became evident in August 2020, when the company announced
losses and stated that it was lowering its 2020 projections.9
Allegedly as a result, the company’s stock price declined by 11
percent.10
Meanwhile, on March 4, 2020, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a temporary rule providing
leniency to public companies in filing their required quarterly
Form 10-Q reports, annual Form 10-K reports, and current
Form 8-K reports.11 Specifically, the SEC extended the
deadlines for filings otherwise due before May 1, 2020, by
forty-five days, provided a filing company met certain
conditions.12 According to the SEC, the basis for the temporary
rule was to assist companies grappling with the challenges
associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.13 Under a modified
version of the rule dated March 25, 2020, the SEC extended this
relief to cover all Form 10-Q, 10-K, and 8-K reports otherwise
due prior to July 1, 2020.14

release stating that the company’s “financial performance . . . largely reflects
conditions experienced prior to the COVID-19 pandemic”).
8. See id. at 9–12 (quoting relevant portions of the Form 10-Q report,
which described positive financial outcomes for the quarter and effective
controls and procedures, as well as the content of a press release accompanying
the report).
9. See id. at 13–14 (quoting relevant portions of the August 24, 2020,
press release).
10. See id. at 14 (detailing the alleged losses).
11. See Order Under Section 36 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Granting Exemptions from Specified Provisions of the Exchange Act and
Certain Rules Thereunder, Exchange Act Release No. 88,318, 85 Fed. Reg.
13,680, 13,680 (Mar. 9, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 Disclosure Rule] (setting forth
the relief and the conditions associated with a company’s reliance on it).
12. See id. at 13,680–81.
13. See id. at 13,680 (noting that the purpose of the rule was to “assist
affected entities with meeting their obligations under the federal securities
laws”).
14. See Order Under Section 36 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Modifying Exemptions from the Reporting and Proxy Delivery Requirements
for Public Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 88,465, 85 Fed. Reg. 17,610,
17,610 (Mar. 30, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 Disclosure Rule Extension].
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The pandemic presented difficult trade-offs in its early
months. Perhaps the most obvious one is that, although
implementing measures such as “lockdowns” and temporary
business closures was arguably critical for ensuring the
population’s health and safety, those protective measures
contributed to widespread unemployment and threatened
near-term economic growth.15 There was also a less-obvious
trade-off. While the pandemic was creating conditions that
promoted incidences of securities fraud and accompanying
litigation,16 the SEC steadily adopted temporary measures to
provide relief to public companies and public investment funds
to help them comply with their ongoing obligations under the
securities laws.
Temporary rules, though rarely (if ever) studied, are not
new. They are a regulatory response to national and
international crises that present hardships for public companies
as well as some private ones.17 These crises include not only the
2020 pandemic but also the 2007–2009 financial crisis and the
“dot-com”
stock
market
decline
and
2001–2002
contemporaneous September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.18 The
temporary rules adopted to date demonstrate that the agency
15. See Greg Ip, Economics vs. Epidemiology: Quantifying the Trade-Offs,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2020, 9:57 PM), https://perma.cc/Y8P3-YN5P (“The rising
economic toll of pandemic-induced shutdowns is fueling suspicions that
government leaders are listening too much to epidemiologists and not enough
to economists.”).
16. See J. Timothy Mast et al., Operating in a Pandemic: Securities
Litigation Risk and Navigating Disclosure Concerns, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (May 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/D7FH-SJPM (“The COVID-19
pandemic has introduced new corporate disclosure issues and increased the
attendant risk of securities fraud actions, as evidenced by plaintiffs’ initial
filings across the country in the past few weeks.”).
17. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-422 (2022)
A rule and regulation may be adopted by a state agency as a
temporary rule and regulation if the state agency and the state
rules and regulations board finds that the preservation of the public
peace, health, safety or welfare necessitates or makes desirable
putting such rule and regulation into effect prior to the time it could
be put into effect if the agency were to comply with the notice,
hearing and publication requirements . . . .
18. See infra Part IV.A (describing some of the temporary rules that the
SEC adopted to address challenges arising from recent securities market
crises).
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deems these rules—which typically take the form of “orders”
rather than “rules”—necessary in times of crisis to provide
either leeway to companies struggling with the demands of
ongoing regulatory compliance19 or protection for companies
suffering weakened positions vis-à-vis other market
participants.20 As this description suggests, the purposes of
temporary rulemaking may differ from crisis to crisis. Some
temporary rules provide leniency to market participants
(“leniency rules”), while others apply greater limitations to
market participants’ activities to prevent them from harming
other participants (“stringency rules”).21
The former purpose generally provided the rationale for the
SEC’s temporary rulemaking during the pandemic. But as the
examples above suggest, temporary rules may have
unanticipated adverse effects on the securities markets and
More
specifically,
Forms
10-K
and
investors.22
10-Q—publicly-released annual and quarterly reports,
respectively, which are required of public companies under the
securities laws—contain information that is important to
investors regarding the companies’ operational and financial
health.23 Particularly in the pandemic context, these reports can
inform investors about such things as the incidence of
COVID-19 among a company’s customers (companies in the
travel industry), products the company is developing to combat
or
prevent
COVID-19
(pharmaceutical
companies),
cybersecurity risks in connection with online meeting platforms
(technology companies), and, more generally, the company’s
19. See infra notes 50–67 and accompanying text (describing some of the
temporary rules adopted by the SEC during the 2020 pandemic).
20. See infra notes 145–161 and accompanying text (describing the
temporary rules adopted by the SEC during the 20072009 financial crisis).
21. As Part III.A describes, most of the SEC’s temporary rules during the
2020 pandemic and in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks could be characterized as leniency rules, while most of those that the
agency adopted during the 2007–2009 financial crisis could be characterized
as stringency rules.
22. See Mast et al., supra note 16 (discussing the potential for increased
litigation against publicly held companies due to changes in policies resulting
from the COVID-19 pandemic).
23. See infra notes 77–92 and accompanying text (describing the
importance of these required securities regulatory filings).
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success is generating revenues and profits during the
pandemic.24
Yet as a result of the SEC’s temporary rules, these
disclosures, which in some cases suggest the occurrence of fraud
or misrepresentations, may have been delayed by over a month.
This delay, in turn, may have exacerbated the length of time
during which the market relied on incorrect information. In
addition, although these particular rules applied only to reports
otherwise due during the four-month period from March 1, 2020,
to July 1, 2020, those months constituted a significant period for
companies’ disclosures concerning their financial viability at the
onset of the pandemic.
In addition, the public company context presents only one
area of possible concern; another is the public fund context.
Public funds are entities registered as such with the SEC,25
including mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs), the
mainstay of retail and, importantly, retirement plan investing.26
These entities are heavily regulated under the securities laws to
ensure that the firms that operate them (to which this Article
refers as fund managers, for ease of reference) act as fiduciaries
to investors, putting investors’ interests first at all times.27
Accordingly, the accompanying principle under the securities
24. See Jay Clayton & William Hinman, The Importance of
Disclosure— For Investors, Markets and Our Fight Against COVID-19, SEC
(Apr. 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/2B7A-4LLX (noting “Intense Investor Interest
in Company-Specific Operational and Financial Status and Plans for
Addressing the Effects of COVID-19” and that investors use the information
in quarterly reporting, “including management commentary regarding trends,
and future expectations of financial condition and risks, to gauge value and
estimate future firm performance”).
25. Investment companies are therefore also public companies. However,
the securities laws’ regulation of them is sufficiently different from the
securities laws’ regulation of public companies that are business enterprises
that they are a different category for purposes of this Article’s discussion.
26. See, e.g., Mutual Funds and Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs)A
Guide for Investors, SEC, https://perma.cc/SX4R-ZHA5 (last updated Jan. 26,
2017) (“American investors often turn to mutual funds and exchange-traded
funds (ETFs) to save for retirement and other financial goals.”).
27. See Jeff Schwartz, Should Mutual Funds Invest in Startups? A Case
Study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s Investments in Unicorns (and other
Startups) and the Regulatory Implications, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1356 (2017)
(“Because of the trust investors bestow in them, mutual fund managers are
fiduciaries of the funds they manage and, by extension, their shareholders.”).
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laws is to mitigate or eliminate, to the extent possible, all
conflicts of interest—that is, the temptation of fund managers
to put their interests ahead of investors’ interests.28 Indeed, this
imperative is the basis of numerous rules and obligations to
which funds and fund managers are subject.29
Unlike in the public company context, however, there has
been no surge of litigation or SEC disciplinary actions against
funds and fund managers since the onset of the pandemic. This
is not surprising, given that misconduct by fund managers,
when it exists, is often detected during SEC examinations and
investigations, which are typically lengthy processes even
without the resource and logistics limitations wrought by the
pandemic.30 Nevertheless, the financial and viability challenges
that public funds faced as a result of the pandemic were severe,
encompassing both investor withdrawals and subpar
performance. Accordingly, fund managers might have been
tempted to act on conflicts of interest, such as by departing from
their stated investment policies in light of market volatility or
by withholding the disclosure of adverse material information
about changes to fund operations. But as these and other risks

28. See Stacy Goto Grant, Note, International Financial Regulation
Through the G20: The Proprietary Trading Case Study, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L.
1217, 1221–22 (2014) (observing that proprietary trading by financial
professionals creates conflicts of interest and that, although these conflicts
“are supposed to be restricted by fiduciary relationships, . . . the desire to
make money for the firm’s own account creates perverse incentives to violate
any fiduciary duties”).
29. See Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1356–61.
30. See, e.g., Lori Richards, Remarks Before the: Greater Cincinnati
Mutual Fund Association Directors’ Workshop, SEC (Sept. 22, 2005),
https://perma.cc/GP37-P7BJ (“The primary goal of the SEC’s examination
oversight is to detect, and to deter, fraud and other violations that can harm
investors.”). Indeed, the SEC’s public failures to detect fraud through its
examinations have led the agency to reevaluate its examination procedures
and seek to improve them. See Robert Khuzami & John Walsh, Testimony
Concerning the SEC’s Failure to Identify the Bernard L. Madoff Ponzi Scheme
and How to Improve SEC Performance, SEC (Sept. 10, 2009),
https://perma.cc/9A2D-5V46 (stating that “we failed in our fundamental
mission to protect investors, and we must continue vigorously to reform the
way we operate” in testimony before Congress about the agency’s “failure to
detect the massive fraud perpetrated by Bernard Madoff”).
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grew, the SEC adopted temporary rules to help fund managers
endure crisis conditions.31
To the extent the SEC’s temporary rules succeeded in
assisting public companies and public funds in overcoming at
least some of the financial and operational challenges arising
from the pandemic, they surely were a welcome salve. With
these rules in place, market participants experiencing
significant operational disruptions that impeded their ability to
comply with disclosure deadlines, for example, were assured
that they would not be deemed to have violated the securities
laws.32 This result arguably benefitted not only the entities at
issue but also the securities markets to the extent that it eased
regulatory burdens that could interfere with market
participation. At the same time, however, some of the temporary
rules seemed to stand at cross-purposes with securities law
objectives—namely, protecting investors and promoting capital
formation—especially because those objectives become
particularly critical during a crisis, when public companies and
funds are facing severe challenges.
This Article evaluates temporary rules in securities
regulation and previously-unexplored issues relating to them.
In the process, it discusses the tensions arising from the
securities regulatory imperative to protect investors and
promote investor confidence in the integrity of the securities
markets, on the one hand, and to incentivize and encourage the
expansion and growth in a capitalist economy, on the other.
Although these tensions are readily apparent, in the temporary
rule context critical instances of them are largely overlooked by
scholars and commentators in both the public company and the
public fund realms.
Further, and more important, this Article opens new
territory for analysis by evaluating which types of temporary
rules are appropriate and when. That is, which types of crises

31. See Division of Investment Management Coronavirus (COVID-19)
Response FAQs, SEC, https://perma.cc/TSM8-W4ZV (last updated Nov. 1,
2021) (exploring various aspects of the SEC’s implementation of temporary
rules resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic and how fund managers might
benefit from them).
32. See infra Part I.B (describing the temporary rules that the SEC
adopted to ease the compliance burdens of public companies and their
managers).
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call for temporary rules that provide leniency, and which ones
create conditions for the SEC’s imposition of additional
strictures on what firms can and cannot do? As this Article
argues, there are important differences among types of
crises—and types of industries—that should inform the SEC
and other regulators navigating future crises as they make
decisions about temporary rules, whether those rules provide
leniency or impose more stringent regulation to prevent
destructive market behavior.
As part of its project to elucidate temporary rulemaking in
the securities context, this Article addresses a final component
of temporary rulemaking, one that constitutes yet another arena
for further exploration. Temporary rules may provide
opportunities for regulatory experimentation. That is, while
some temporary rules may present investor protection concerns,
others may create possibilities for permanent rulemaking. In
the context of the pandemic, for example, the SEC adopted
temporary rules suspending requirements under both the
Investment Company Act and the SEC’s associated rules that
certain decisions by public fund boards of directors be made
during in-person board meetings.33 After months during which
boards relied on these rules, carrying out all meetings on online
platforms, the prospect arose that the SEC might make this
relief permanent—a rule change that likely would not otherwise
have been under consideration and that arguably is warranted
in the technology era. This is an example of how the SEC might
strategically deploy temporary rules moving forward, including
in non-crisis situations.
This Article consists of four parts. Part I discusses certain
shareholder lawsuits against public companies and their
managers that arose during the pandemic and that alleged
wrongdoing based on company statements and disclosures
related to conditions created by the pandemic. It further notes
the types of industries that experienced significant shareholder
litigation and describes the temporary regulatory relief that the
SEC simultaneously provided to these entities to help them
navigate pandemic-related challenges, regardless of the
industry. Part II turns to public funds and fund managers,

33. See infra Part III.A (describing the basis for and general content of
these rules).
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articulating the risks that crisis conditions create for investors
in mutual funds, ETFs, and other public investment entities. In
addition, it describes how, through temporary rulemaking, the
SEC eased the regulatory obligations with which these entities
must otherwise comply. Part III evaluates the persistence of the
regulation-leniency trade-off more broadly, contending that the
ways in which crisis circumstances may call for special
regulatory approaches should vary based on the nature of the
crisis. Through that lens, it assesses the SEC’s overall approach
to temporary rules during the pandemic, apart from the merits
of any particular temporary rule. Finally, Part IV suggests that,
although some of the temporary rules adopted during the
pandemic are worrisome from an investor-protection
standpoint, a swath of the temporary rules nevertheless has
been more benign or even efficiency-enhancing. In addition, it
contends that, to further the cause of more effective regulation,
some of these rules are good candidates to become permanent
rules. A brief conclusion follows.
I.

PUBLIC COMPANIES

As soon as the pandemic took its hold on the United States
and the world, it was evident that substantial
litigation—specifically, shareholder class actions—would ensue
as a result of the challenging circumstances the pandemic would
create across the economy. By late May 2020, several hundred
lawsuits stemming from the pandemic, both securities-related
and otherwise, were pending in both state and federal courts,
with 442 class actions filed in the United States from March 1
through the end of May 2020 alone.34 In the securities context,
shareholders filed substantial numbers of “pandemic lawsuits”
each week, a circumstance that continued even after pandemic
conditions began to subside.35
34. See DLA PIPER, PREPARING FOR GLOBAL CLASS ACTIONS ARISING FROM
COVID-19, at 2 (2020), https://perma.cc/GC86-NPDW (PDF) (setting forth
overviews of, and statistics relating to, COVID-19-related class actions in both
the United States and Canada).
35. See ELIZABETH L. MITCHELL ET AL., WILMERHALE, COVID-19: THE
VIRUS CREATES NEW REGULATORY PRIORITIES AND LITIGATION RISKS FOR PUBLIC
COMPANIES AND MARKET PARTICIPANTS 4 (2020), https://perma.cc/USS5-SALK
(observing that “the pace of new private securities lawsuits has not abated,”
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Part I.A describes types of pandemic-related securities class
action lawsuits that shareholders of public companies filed
during the first year of the pandemic. Although the facts of each
case are not themselves instructive as to the advisability of
temporary rules, these lawsuits are informative as to the
circumstances under which temporary rules may be
appropriate. Part I.B describes an important temporary rule
that the SEC adopted to alleviate certain compliance pressures
that companies might experience because of pandemic
conditions and associated challenges, as well as problems
arising from the delayed disclosure that this rule permitted.
A.

Pandemic Litigation

From the beginning, a few industries were obvious
candidates for federal securities litigation because the goods or
services they provide have in some way played a role during the
pandemic or created risks relating to it. As an example, several
lawsuits filed during the first year of the pandemic were against
travel companies, including cruise operators. In addition to the
lawsuit against Carnival Corporation described in the
Introduction, shareholders of Norwegian Cruise Lines sued the
company and its CEO in mid-March.36 In the latter case,
plaintiffs alleged that the Form 8-K report and press release the
company made public on February 20, 2020, failed to disclose
the actual impact that COVID-19 was having on its customers
and the company’s financial outlook.37 Plaintiffs further alleged
that the company’s Form 10-K, filed a week later, did not
disclose that Norwegian sales representatives were providing
false information to customers and potential customers to
discourage them from cancelling cruise trips or to encourage

that this fact is not surprising because this type of litigation “thrives on market
volatility and uncertainty,” and that “[s]tock price drops create aggrieved
investors”).
36. See Complaint at 1, Douglas v. Norwegian Cruise Lines, No.
1:20-cv-21107 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2020).
37. See id. at 5–7 (alleging that statements in these documents
“misrepresented and failed to disclose adverse facts pertaining to the
Company’s business, operations and prospects, which were known to
Defendants or recklessly disregarded by them”).
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them to purchase new cruise packages.38 After the Miami New
Times’ March 11, 2020, publication of an article detailing
Norwegian’s actual circumstances, the price of the company’s
shares fell by 26.7 percent.39 It fell by another 35.8 percent on
March 12, 2020, after the Washington Post published an article
disclosing additional information about Norwegian’s sales
tactics.40
Other types of travel companies, such as airlines, also
became pandemic class-action defendants, in light of the
pandemic’s substantial adverse effect on air travel.
Shareholders of GOL Linhas Aereas Inteligentes, a Brazilian
airline, sued the company and its CEO on September 30, 2020,
alleging that, through July, the company had made false and
misleading statements about the quality of its internal controls
and strength of its financial outlook.41 The company’s stock price
fell by an aggregate 12.6 percent allegedly based on, among
other things, the company’s June 16, 2020, disclosure of
weaknesses in its internal controls,42 its disclosure in its annual
report filed on June 29, 2020, that its independent auditor had
expressed doubts about its continuation,43 and its July 23, 2020,
announcement that it had terminated its independent auditor.44
Pharmaceutical and health care companies were a second
unsurprising litigation target. On the same day that
shareholders filed the Norwegian Cruise Lines action, a second

38. See id. at 7 (noting that the company had employed “sales tactics of
providing customers with unproven and/or blatantly false statements about
COVID-19 to entice [them] to purchase cruises”).
39. See id. at 7–8 (quoting relevant excerpts from the Miami New Times’
article).
40. See id. at 9 (quoting relevant excerpts from the Washington Post
article).
41. See Complaint at 4–10, Timotheo v. GOL Linhas Aereas Inteligentes
S.A., No. 1:20-cv-04644 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2020) (setting forth alleged
misstatements spanning a period from February 20, 2020, through July 31,
2020).
42. See id. at 7–8 (quoting relevant excerpts from the company’s June 16
disclosure, which was in the form of a Form 12b-25 SEC filing).
43. See id. at 9 (quoting relevant excerpts from the company’s June 29
disclosure).
44. See id. at 9–10 (quoting relevant excerpts from the company’s July 23
announcement).
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set of shareholders sued Inovio Pharmaceuticals and its CEO on
the basis that the company falsely claimed in mid-February
2020 that it had developed a COVID-19 vaccine in a matter of
hours and that human testing of the product was imminent.45
Having quadrupled during this time,46 the company’s stock price
dropped by 71 percent after a short-seller called out the alleged
misstatements—disclosing that, in fact, the company had not
developed a vaccine for COVID-19—and publicly urged the SEC
to investigate.47
In another health care case, shareholders of SCWorx Corp.,
a health care technology company, sued the company and its
CEO on April 29, 2020, alleging that the company’s mid-April
press release, in which it announced that it had received a large
order for COVID-19 testing kits with ongoing significant weekly
orders thereafter, was misleading and false.48 The plaintiffs
further alleged that the company’s stock price sank by over 17
percent when, less than a week after the press release, a
research firm issued a report stating that the orders were
“completely bogus,” that the company’s CEO had been
previously convicted of tax evasion, and that the CEO of the
company’s supplier had “questionable credibility,” among other
things.49 Five days later, the SEC stopped trading of the
company’s stock.50
45. See Complaint at 3, McDermid v. Inovio Pharms., Inc., No.
2:20-cv-01402-GJP (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2020) (quoting J. Joseph Kim, the
company’s CEO, who stated that the company had developed a COVID-19
vaccine “in a matter of about three hours once we had the DNA sequence from
the virus”).
46. According to the complaint, the stock price rose “from $4.28 per share
on February 28, 2020” to “an intra-day high of $19.36 on March 9, 2020.” Id.
at 4.
47. See id. at 4 (noting that the stock price dropped from an opening price
of $18.72 on March 9, 2020, to a closing price of $5.70 on March 10, 2020).
48. See Complaint at 1, Yannes v. SCWorx Corp., No. 1:20-cv-03349
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2020) (recounting that the company announced that it had
received orders for “two million COVID-19 rapid testing kits, ‘with provision
for additional weekly orders of 2 million units for 23 weeks, valued at $35M
per week’”(citation omitted)).
49. See id. at 5–6 (quoting and highlighting relevant excerpts from the
research report).
50. See id. at 6 (detailing that the SEC halted trading of SCWorx Corp.’s
stock on April 22, 2020).
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In three other cases against pharmaceutical companies,
shareholders alleged false and misleading statements relating
to the efficacy of COVID-19 testing products under
development.51 The plaintiffs’ claims in these cases were that
the relevant company made false and misleading statements in
saying either that it had discovered an antibody that
“demonstrated 100% inhibition” of COVID-19 infection or that
its diagnostic test for COVID-19 or antibodies, as the case may
be, was 100 percent accurate.52 The revelation of the truth in
each case—namely, that the companies’ respective products
were not 100 percent effective or accurate—occurred from
mid-May through mid-June 2020, including through a Form 8-K
filing. Allegedly as a result of these disclosures, the three
companies’ stock prices declined by 49 percent, 38 percent, and
60 percent, respectively.53

51. See Complaint at 7, Wasa Med. Holdings v. Sorrento Therapeutics,
Inc., No. 3:20-cv-00966-AJB-AGS (S.D. Cal. May 26, 2020) [hereinafter
Sorrento Therapeutics Complaint] (quoting Mark R. Brunswick, a Vice
President of the company, who stated on May 15, 2020 that, “[a]s soon as [the
antibody] is infused, that patient is now immune to the disease . . . [f]or the
length of time, the antibody is in that system”); Complaint at 12–13, Gelt
Trading, Ltd. v. Co-Diagnostics, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-00368-CMR (D. Utah June
15, 2020) [hereinafter Co-Diagnostics Complaint] (quoting a May 1, 2020,
press release from the company stating that the performance data for its
COVID-19 diagnostics test “demonstrate[ed] 100% sensitivity and 100%
specificity, the metrics used to determine accuracy in molecular diagnostics
testing”); Complaint at 9, Chernysh v. Chembio Diagnostics, Inc., No.
2:20-cv-02706-ARR-ARL (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2020) [hereinafter Chembio
Diagnostics Complaint] (quoting a May 4, 2020, statement by Richard L.
Eberly, the company’s CEO, that the “accuracy of the [test] after 11 days post
the onset of symptoms is 100% for total antibodies”).
52. See Sorrento Therapeutics Complaint, supra note 51, at 7;
Co-Diagnostics Complaint, supra note 51, at 1213; Chembio Diagnostics
Complaint, supra note 51, at 9.
53. See Sorrento Therapeutics Complaint, supra note 51, at 10 (noting
that, after the third parties placed the company’s claims into doubt beginning
on May 20, 2020, the company’s stock price declined by over 49 percent);
Co-Diagnostics Complaint, supra note 51, at 15 (noting that disclosures by
third parties on May 14, 2020, cast the company’s claims into doubt and that
the company’s stock price fell by more than 38 percent as a result); Chembio
Diagnostics Complaint, supra note 51, at 12 (claiming that the company’s stock
price declined by over 60 percent as a result of the FDA’s June 16, 2020,
disclosure contradicting the company’s claims).
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A third category of early-pandemic litigation involved the
mainstay
of
working-from-home
videoconferencing
services—namely, Zoom. Alleging that Zoom Video
Communications and its CEO failed to use appropriate data
privacy and security protocols, shareholders of the company
sued on April 7, 2020.54 Although, according to the plaintiffs, the
truth began to emerge in July 2019 following third party
disclosures that a user’s Zoom camera function could be
remotely enabled by external malicious websites,55 details about
Zoom’s allegedly inadequate security measures and
information-sharing practices became fully apparent only after
the pandemic had begun.56 When news articles published in late
March 2020 revealed this, the company’s stock price dropped by
19.62 percent and dropped another 4.1 percent on April 6, 2020,
after the publication of additional news articles.57
Despite these more “obvious” types of lawsuit targets, many
securities class action lawsuits arising early-on in the pandemic
instead involved the basic concerns that defendant companies,
including those without any special relationship to or
involvement with the pandemic, misrepresented the pandemic’s
effect on their financial results and projections and overall
operations. Two of the examples that opened this Article fall into
this category.58 Another example was the lawsuit brought by
shareholders of Ideanomics, Inc., a company with operations in
China.59 In their June 28, 2020, complaint, the plaintiffs claimed
that between March and June 2020—when pandemic-related
shutdowns were adversely affecting businesses in China—the
company issued false and misleading press releases that
claimed strong performance by its electric car division, among

54. See Complaint at 7–13, Drieu v. Zoom Video Commc’ns, Inc., No.
5:20-cv-02353-JD (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2020) (stating that the company “failed to
disclose material adverse facts about [its] business, operational and
compliance policies” and setting forth specific bases for these claims).
55. See id. at 8–9.
56. See id. at 14–19 (noting a series of media reports regarding Zoom’s
security practices and associated scrutiny from two state Attorneys General).
57. See id. at 17–18.
58. See supra notes 4–10 and accompanying text.
59. See generally Complaint, Lundy v. Ideanomics, Inc., No.
1:20-cv-04944 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2020).
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other things.60 Shortly thereafter, the company announced
plans to offer $250 million in common stock, after which a
research analyst contended in a series of tweets that Ideanomics
had made a variety of false statements in its then-recent press
releases and that the releases were a part of the company’s
“stock pump and dump on a neverending [sic] stream of press
releases over the past 5 years.”61 Allegedly as a result of these
tweets and additional ones from another third-party researcher,
the company’s stock price fell almost 53 percent over two days.62
These securities class-action lawsuits are merely
representative of all those that shareholders in a range of
industries have filed since the pandemic started. To be sure, not
all of the lawsuits have been (or will be) found to have merit.63
However, these suits represent the tip of an iceberg of
pandemic-related securities litigation.64 This type of litigation
is, after all, fueled by price volatility and market
uncertainty—the products of a rapidly-evolving business
environment.65 That is, when a company’s stock price falls,
shareholders become aggrieved.66 Meanwhile, even for the most
forthright companies, when the surrounding economic and
business environments evolve rapidly, even recent disclosures
quickly become obsolete.67 Nevertheless, just as the factors
60. See id. at 6–9 (quoting relevant excerpts from Ideanomics’s press
releases in March through June 2020).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 14.
63. Meritless securities class actions have been a concern among courts
and Congress for years, and Congress’s attempt to curb meritless claims in
favor of meritorious ones, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.), has not produced the intended results. See Congress, the Supreme
Court, and the Rise of Securities-Fraud Class Actions, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1067,
1071 (2019) (“[W]hile the PSLRA did reduce frivolous lawsuits to some extent,
the continuing surge in securities-fraud class actions suggests that excessive
litigation remains a serious problem.”).
64. See ELIZABETH L. MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 35, at 4 (“Although each
day seems to bring news of yet another court curtailing operations and limiting
new filings, the pace of new private securities lawsuits has not abated, and we
anticipate that it is likely to increase.”).
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
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causing the surge of shareholder litigation are important, the
lessons we might learn from that surge, in terms of developing
more effective temporary regulation, are as well.
B.

Temporary Rules for Public Companies

In large part, temporary rules are intended to provide
leniency to companies in complying with the many obligations
to which they are subject under the securities laws.68 Not only
is securities law compliance onerous and time-consuming for
publicly-held companies, it is also expensive.69 Not surprisingly,
all three aspects—the burden, the time allotment, and the
expense—heighten the operational and financial challenges
that companies face during crisis situations.70 This section
discusses the significance of what is, arguably, the most
significant temporary rule that the SEC adopted to assist public
companies in navigating the challenges caused by the pandemic
and the adjustments to company operations that the pandemic
necessitated. Although this rule was relatively short-lived—the
SEC did not extend it after July 1, 2020,71 likely because of the

68. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Provides Temporary, Conditional
Relief to Allow Small Businesses to Pursue Expedited Crowdfunding Offerings
(May 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/A8YT-A338 (“The temporary rules are the
latest in a series of steps the Commission has taken to assist financial market
participants in addressing the impacts of the coronavirus.”).
69. See 3A HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SEC. & FED. CORP.
L. § 8:1 (2d ed. 2020) (assessing the “possible disadvantages” of becoming a
public company as “certain reporting, proxy solicitation, insider trading and
other responsibilities under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, all of which are time-consuming and expensive”).
70. See GIBSON DUNN, SEC ENFORCEMENT FOCUS ON FALLOUT FROM
COVID-19: INSIGHTS FOR PUBLIC COMPANIES AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS
DURING A CRISIS 1 (2020), https://perma.cc/NT3V-8YS4 (PDF) (“History
teaches us that unprecedented market volatility, fast moving economic events,
and dislocations create substantial challenges for compliance . . . .”).
71. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Extends Conditional Exemptions from
Reporting and Proxy Delivery Requirements for Public Companies, Funds,
and Investment Advisers Affected by Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
(Mar. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/2C7X-V8A7 (providing a forty-five-day
extension to file certain disclosure reports that would otherwise have been due
between March 1 and July 1, 2020).
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stock market’s partial recovery by that point—it could have
endured much longer, as many past temporary rules have.72
On March 4, 2020, the SEC’s Division of Corporation
Finance adopted a temporary rule that, while in effect, extended
the deadline for the filing of certain required disclosure reports
with the SEC.73 Under the rule, companies that were unable to
meet a filing deadline for reports due between March 1 and May
1, 2020, because of COVID-19-related circumstances were
granted an additional forty-five days to submit the reports,
including annual reports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on
Form 10-Q, and current reports on Form 8-K.74 Pursuant to an
extension of this rule on March 30, 2020,75 the relief applied to
reports that would otherwise have been due between March 1
and July 1, 2020.76
This temporary rule was one of the most important of the
SEC’s temporary rules during the pandemic—at least as among
those that applied to public companies, as opposed to public
funds—because reports filed on Forms 10-Q, 10-K, and 8-K are
important. All three reports are required by SEC rules, which
the agency adopted per its authority under the Securities

72. See, e.g., Extension of Temporary Registration of Municipal Advisors,
Exchange Act Release No. 70,468, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,814, 59,814 (extending the
effective period of a temporary rule from September 2013 to December 2014).
73. See 2020 Disclosure Rule, supra note 11, at 13,680–81(providing the
conditions under which the deadlines were extended).
74. See id. at 13,681 (listing, as a condition of a company’s reliance on the
rule, that the company “files with the Commission any report, schedule, or
form required to be filed no later than 45 days after the original due date”).
Under a separate temporary rule adopted on March 26, 2020, the Division gave
affected companies the same forty-five-day extension to file disclosure reports
under Regulation A and Regulation Crowdfunding—rules that allow
companies to sell certain dollar amounts in securities without registering the
offerings with the SEC—that were otherwise required to be filed between
March 26 and May 31, 2020. See Relief for Form ID Filers and Regulation
Crowdfunding and Regulation A Issuers Related to Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19), Exchange Act Release No. 10,768, 85 Fed. Reg. 17,747, 17,748
(Mar. 31, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 227, 230, and 232).
75. See 2020 Disclosure Rule Extension, supra note 14, at 17,610, 17,610
(Mar. 30, 2020) (extending the rule to July 1, 2020).
76. See id. (extending the rule on the basis that “market participants
continue to face challenges in meeting the reporting and proxy delivery
requirements of the federal securities laws in a timely manner”).
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Exchange Act of 1934.77 All three reports, moreover, are critical
sources of information for investors and prospective investors.78
In light of the importance of these reports, a brief description of
each is warranted.
The Form 10-K report is a comprehensive report that public
companies must file with the SEC on an annual basis.79 It is
even more comprehensive than a company’s annual report,
which the company prepares and sends to shareholders prior to
the annual shareholder meeting to detail its activities
throughout the preceding year.80 Among the items that
companies must include in their Form 10-K reports are
information and disclosures about their business operations,
financial health (which must include audited financial
statements),
subsidiaries
and
affiliates,
executive
compensation, dividend policies, material legal proceedings, risk
factors, and properties owned.81
Because of its detail and depth of information, a Form 10-K
report is regarded as the most important document issued by a

77. See James A. Fanto et al., Justifying Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV.
901, 907 n.17 (2011)
A public company has multiple disclosure obligations, including the
filing of an annual report on Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-1
(2010); the filing of quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, § 240.15d-13;
the filing of “special” reports on Form 8-K whenever one of the
events enumerated in the Form occurs, § 240.15d-11; and the filing
of a proxy statement for the annual shareholders’ meeting (as well
as for special meetings), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (2010).
78. See Knowing the Difference Between a 10-K, 10-Q and an 8-K,
DAVEMANUEL.COM
(July
31,
2008),
https://perma.cc/6U4Y-ZXZ7
(characterizing these reports as important because they “force” companies “to
completely disclose pertinent information about their business and corporate
structure to investors”).
79. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-1 (2021) (“Every registrant under the
Securities Act of 1933 shall file an annual report, on the appropriate form
authorized or prescribed therefor, for the fiscal year in which the registration
statement under the Securities Act of 1933 became effective and for each fiscal
year thereafter . . . .”).
80. See Will Kenton, 10-K, INVESTOPEDIA, https://perma.cc/NAJ4-B268
(last updated Mar. 16, 2020) (comparing the Form 10-K report to the annual
shareholder report).
81. See id. (describing the information to be reported on Form 10-K).
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public company.82 However, Form 10-Q is important in its own
right because companies must file it more frequently—namely,
on a quarterly basis.83 Although it is similar to Form 10-K, it
requires fewer details,84 and although it requires the submission
of financial statements, those statements may be unaudited.85
One purpose of Form 10-Q is to present a comparison of a
company’s performance in the current financial quarter with its
performance in the previous one.86
The reports on Forms 10-K and 10-Q are important for
another reason. Each requires a narrative, found in the
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section, that
explains a company’s financial results and elaborates on (and
provides context for) its overall financial condition and any
variations in its cash flow and earnings.87 Because the MD&A
section sets forth the views and opinions of a company’s
managers—the only part of the form that does so—it helps
82. See id. (noting that “[b]ecause of the depth and nature of the
information they contain, 10-Ks are fairly long and tend to be complicated” but
that “investors need to understand that this is one of the most comprehensive
and most important documents a public company can publish on a yearly
basis”).
83. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-13(a) (2021) (“[E]very issuer that has
securities registered pursuant to the Securities Act and is required to file
annual reports pursuant to section 15(d) of the Act on Form 10-K . . . shall file
a quarterly report on Form 10-Q . . . .”).
84. See GERD D. THOMSEN, MORRISON & FOERSTER, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS ABOUT PERIODIC REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. ISSUERS
PRINCIPAL EXCHANGE ACT REPORTS 6 (2013), https://perma.cc/7W8B-6NPS
(PDF) (“Form 10-Q contains information similar to that contained in the Form
10-K, however, the information is generally less detailed.”).
85. See Form 10-Q, INVESTOR.GOV, https://perma.cc/8MMD-XASG (“The
Form 10-Q includes unaudited financial statements and provides a continuing
view of the company’s financial position during the year.”).
86. See Will Kenton, SEC Form 10-Q Definition, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://perma.cc/7HS9-24WQ (last updated Apr. 16, 2021) (“Investors can use
[Form 10-Q] to get a sense of [a company’s] quarterly earnings and other
elements of its operations, and to compare them to previous quarters—thus
tracking its performance.”).
87. See How to Read a 10-K/10-Q, INVESTOR.GOV (Jan. 25, 2021),
https://perma.cc/NP3M-567F (noting that the MD&A section presents, among
other things, “[t]he company’s operations and financial results, including
information about the company’s liquidity and capital resources and any
known trends or uncertainties that could materially affect the company’s
results”).
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provide an indication of how the company may perform going
forward.88 However, although the section contains managers’
opinions, those opinions must have a factual basis and reflect a
balanced vision of the company’s prospects.89
Form 8-K reports are a third public disclosure report of
note, the objective behind them being to allow companies to
provide current disclosure about noteworthy events.90 That is, a
company is required to use Form 8-K to disclose certain
unscheduled material events relating to the company’s
operations that may be of importance to investors, the SEC, or
the securities markets more generally.91 Events necessitating
that a company file a Form 8-K report include, among other
things, the resignation or appointment of a director, changes to
the company’s financial situation, bankruptcy, closing an
acquisition, delisting a class of the company’s shares,
termination of its auditor, revisions to its code of ethics, and
other events that the company considers important for
investors.92
Collectively, Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K are intended to
keep investors and the securities market informed about public
companies’ operations and financial health. Indeed, that is the

88. See id. (noting that the MD&A section “allows company management
to tell its story in its own words”).
89. See
Marshall
Hargrave,
Management
Discussion
and
Analysis— MD&A, INVESTOPEDIA, https://perma.cc/MP6D-ZWLE (last
updated Sept. 30, 2020) (noting that the Financial Accounting Standards
Board requires that statements in the MD&A “be based on fact” and that
“there . . . be an attempt to paint a balanced picture of the company’s future
prospects”).
90. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-11 (2021) (“[E]very registrant [required to file
Forms 10-K] shall file a current report on Form 8-K within the period specified
in that form unless substantially the same information as that required by
Form 8-K has been previously reported by the registrant.”).
91. See OFF. OF INV. EDUC. & ADVOC., SEC, INVESTOR BULLETIN: HOW TO
READ AN 8-K 1 (2021), https://perma.cc/BN6V-YCQD (PDF) (observing that
“[t]he types of information required to be disclosed on Form 8-K are generally
considered to be ‘material,’” meaning that “there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable investor would consider the information important in
making an investment decision”).
92. See Form 8-K, SEC, https://perma.cc/E8LJ-2RHX (last updated Aug.
10, 2012) (listing the events that trigger a company’s obligation to file a Form
8-K).
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purpose of all of the required public disclosures by companies
under the SEC’s authority.93 Armed with the disclosures on
these forms, investors are better able to make informed
decisions about whether to invest in or divest from a company,
and informed observers are better able to analyze the company
and make recommendations to investors about whether to
invest in it.94 Further, so informed about the repositories of their
investments, investors, ideally, should be able to gain confidence
in the market, thereby increasing the likelihood they will invest
beyond what would be the case if they were uninformed.95
Considering the litigation briefly detailed in Part I.A, the
problem with delaying the disclosure of company information
under certain circumstances is clear. Doing so may delay the
disclosure of accurate information to the market. This is critical
in normal circumstances, but it is especially critical when the
market has previously been misled about a company’s
operations or financial performance and is relying on those
earlier misstatements. Without timely disclosure, this reliance
may continue, likely increasing the losses incurred when the
truth is disclosed. To be sure, Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K may
serve as vehicles for new misstatements and inaccuracies. But
unlike a company’s distribution of fraudulent information
93. See Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599, 605 (2013) (noting that “[t]he 1933 and 1934 Acts have
always been very much focused on disclosure” and that the statutes’ legislative
history ties “disclosure and finance inextricably to the integrity of the
markets”).
94. See Susanna Kim Ripken, Paternalism and Securities Regulation, 21
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 2 (2016) (observing that disclosure requirements,
unlike merit-based securities regulation, “merely require the dissemination of
relevant information, thereby empowering investors to analyze their options
and make optimal investment decisions based on disclosed potential risks and
returns”). However, some observers question whether disclosure—whether
through Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K or otherwise—actually furthers this
objective. See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 93, at 603 (“[T]he role of disclosure
in investment decisions is far more limited, and far less straightforward, than
is typically assumed.”).
95. See Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The
SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 999
(2006) (“The logic of federal securities regulation . . . is that the mandatory
disclosure regime . . . shores up investor confidence and the integrity of
securities markets by redressing information asymmetries and targeting
fraud.”).
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through press releases or other disclosures, using Forms 10-K
and 10-Q, in particular, is perilous for the company’s principal
executives, given that they are subject to criminal prosecution if
the reports are found to be inaccurate or incomplete.96
II.

PUBLIC FUNDS

Similar to public companies, mutual funds, ETFs, and other
public investment entities experienced significant challenges as
a result of the pandemic. More precisely, the fund managers that
operate them were challenged as a result of sharp stock-market
declines and volatility that led many fund investors to withdraw
their capital and fund performance to drop appreciably.97 Both
factors served to diminish public fund assets and, in turn, the
amount of management fees that funds pay to the fund
managers that oversee them.98 Although the market generally

96. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 906, 116 Stat.
745 (2002) (providing requirements for corporate responsibility for financial
reports). The Act requires that “[e]ach periodic report containing financial
statements filed by [a company] with the [SEC] pursuant to section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934” be accompanied by a certification
by the company’s CEO and CFO that the information in the report “fairly
[presents] . . . the financial condition and results of operations of the
[company].” Id. The Act also provides criminal penalties for a certifier who
intentionally certifies a report failing to meet this requirement. Id.
97. See EVA SU, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46424, CAPITAL MARKETS VOLATILITY
AND COVID-19: BACKGROUND AND POLICY RESPONSES i (2020) (noting that
“[t]he fund market has . . . experienced high volatility due to COVID-19” and
that “[s]ome funds received new sources of liquidity through the SEC’s
temporary allowance of certain interfund lending and the federal
government’s emergency intervention programs”); Dave Michaels et al., SEC
Gives Relief to Mutual Funds Facing Redemption Issues, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24,
2020, 3:08 PM), https://perma.cc/J8PR-VCK9 (“Investors pulled $40 billion
from taxable bond funds last week alone, and net outflows have totaled $55
billion in the past month . . . .”).
98. The management fees that fund managers earn for managing a fund’s
portfolio are typically calculated as a percentage of the net value of the assets
that the fund holds. See James Chen, Management Fee, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov.
12, 2020), https://perma.cc/5PEM-QBQU. As a result, to the extent that
market volatility produces investment losses and the fund’s investors
withdraw their capital, the product of that calculation diminishes.
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recovered from the volatility early on, for many funds, investor
assets were slow in returning.99
Section II.A delves into the particular risks facing fund
investors during the pandemic and, in this context, the
particular concerns that conflicts of interest posed. Section II.B
describes the temporary rules that the SEC adopted to alleviate
some of the challenges facing funds and fund managers,
including how these rules may have fostered the conflicts that
fund regulation has sought to mitigate. Although these
temporary rules differed significantly from the rule extending
disclosure filing deadlines for public companies, they are
instructive in their own right, especially in terms of lessons to
be learned in grappling with future crises.
A.

Pandemic Conflicts of Interest

The securities laws and rules governing fund managers and
the public funds (mutual funds and so forth) that they manage
are substantively different from those governing public and
private companies not focused on investment services. Among
other things, the Investment Company Act of 1940,100 which
governs funds themselves, and its companion statute, the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940,101 which governs investment
advisers (a group that includes fund managers) are relatively
rule-focused.102 Meanwhile, the two better-known securities
statutes—the Securities Act of 1933,103 which regulates public

99. Cf. Bob Sullivan & Benjamin Curry, Covid-19 Crisis: Investing
Lessons from the Pandemic, FORBES ADVISOR, https://perma.cc/V89G-M8BF
(last updated Mar. 24, 2021, 9:32 AM) (“It took five months to retrace the early
Covid-19 losses and start hitting new all-time highs.”); CARY STIER, DELOITTE,
COVID-19’S IMPACT ON THE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT SECTOR (2020),
https://perma.cc/82RJ-YXTD (noting that “liquidity remains scarce and the
outlook for earnings is soft” in terms of global economic outlook).
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64.
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–80b-21.
102. See, e.g., Porter Wright, How to Avoid Registration Under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, FED. SEC. L. SOURCE (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://perma.cc/8F2X-U8V6 (“The act is draconian in its regulation and can
change the entire business of a company.”).
103. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa.
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securities offerings, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,104
which regulates securities transactions in the secondary
market—are more general because they are centered around
disclosure requirements and fraud prohibitions.105
Specifically, the latter two statutes’ primary regulatory
levers are the requirements to disclose all relevant material
facts and to do so truthfully and completely.106 Meanwhile, the
“investment” statutes regulate via specific rules that apply to
virtually all facets of a public fund’s and its manager’s
operations. For example, the Investment Company Act and the
rules the SEC has adopted under that statute contain
limitations on a public fund’s holdings of “illiquid” securities,107
the amount and form of borrowing the fund may do,108 and, for
a fund that is deemed “diversified,” the amount of net assets
that the fund may invest in an individual portfolio company and
the size of its ownership interest in any individual portfolio
company.109 The statute and rules also prohibit, or severely
104. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78kk.
105. See, e.g., The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, SEC,
https://perma.cc/5LJG-WRSK (“Often referred to as the ‘truth in securities’
law, the Securities Act of 1933 has two basic objectives: require that investors
receive financial and other significant information concerning securities being
offered for public sale; and prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud
in the sale of securities.”).
106. See Heather G. White, A Little Help from Our Friends: Moving Beyond
Enforcement to Improve State and Local Government Compliance with Federal
Securities Laws, 22 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 141–42 (2019) (“[T]he
principal purposes of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, and of the
regulations promulgated under these acts, are promoting accurate and
complete disclosure about securities sold to the public and preventing
fraudulent or unfair practices in the sale of securities.”); Robert B. Thompson
& Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon
Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 869 (2003) (observing that the Securities
Act and the Securities Exchange Act “focus on protecting the integrity of the
markets both by demanding that specific documents exist and by requiring
that, when made, all disclosures be complete and accurate”).
107. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 274 (2008) (limiting a mutual fund’s illiquid
positions as a percentage of fund assets).
108. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any registered
open-end company to issue any class of senior security or to sell any senior
security of which it is the issuer . . . .”).
109.
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1). This section provides that, to be
diversified, a public fund must hold “[a]t least 75 per centum of the value of its
total assets” in cash or securities, “limited in respect of any one issuer to an
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limit, affiliates of a public fund from buying securities from or
selling securities to the public fund,110 borrowing money or
property from the fund, or loaning money or property to the
fund.111 They additionally prohibit a public fund from issuing
debt securities or borrowing money from entities other than
banks.112 For its part, the Investment Advisers Act and
associated SEC rules, while more succinct, also contain an array
of rules governing both fund managers and all other
SEC-regulated investment advisers.113
The collection of mandates in the investment statutes,
particularly ones limiting a public fund’s transactions with
affiliates, evidences their primary role in the investment arena:
mitigating conflicts of interest. Conflicts of interest are
especially rife among fund managers and other fund affiliates.
In part, this is a product of the fact that managers and other
affiliates—a term that includes brokerage firms or other
investment advisers operated by the same larger (multi-entity)
organization or other funds operated within that
organization—may seek to benefit from a fund’s position within
the organization.114 For example, a fund manager that executes
amount not greater in value than 5 per centum of the value of the total assets
of such management company and to not more than 10 per centum of the
outstanding voting securities of such issuer.” Id.
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a)(1), (2) (broadly prohibiting purchases and
sales of securities between an affiliate of a public fund and the fund). Despite
this blanket prohibition on affiliate transactions, the SEC’s rules allow for
these transactions between a public fund and an affiliated public fund
(so-called cross-transactions), subject to certain conditions, including that each
such transaction be done at market price and that no brokerage fee is charged.
See 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a–7 (2006).
111. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a)(3)(4) (broadly prohibiting borrowing and
lending transactions between an affiliate of a public fund and the fund).
112. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any registered
open-end company to issue any class of senior security or to sell any senior
security of which it is the issuer, except that any such registered company shall
be permitted to borrow from any bank . . . .”).
113. See General Information on the Regulation of Investment Advisers,
SEC (Mar. 11, 2011), https://perma.cc/9QVT-K3S4 (summarizing the myriad
rules governing investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act).
114. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Challenge of Fiduciary Regulation: The
Investment Advisers Act After Seventy-Five Years, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 405, 435 (2016) (“Conflicts of interest are common in every fiduciary
relationship in the financial services industry.”).
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a fund’s trades using an affiliated broker may, for the benefit of
the broker, accept the fund’s paying brokerage commissions that
are higher than market rates. Or the manager may cause the
fund to sell securities to another fund it manages at an
inappropriate discount because the manager has a large
investment in the other fund. Or the manager may cause the
fund to buy a particular stock, knowing that the stock price will
rise because of that purchase, thereby allowing the manager to
sell its personal holdings of the same stock at a more desirable
price.115
Distilling these examples, one may conclude that potential
conflicts arise in the investment realm because of two
circumstances. First, the investment realm contains
innumerable complex webs of affiliated entities.116 Second, and
more important, most of these affiliates have a uniform business
objective, which is to profit from investing activities, whether by
investing their own assets, managing other entities’ assets,
brokering securities transactions for others, or playing other
roles in investment transactions.117 For some of these affiliates,
this business objective may come precariously close to another
objective—namely, inappropriately profiting from another
person’s (or entity’s) investing.
Beyond these circumstances, conflicts of interest arise from
the basic fact that fund managers strive to be successful in
managing “their” funds.118 In this context, being successful often
means increasing fund assets, ideally by increasing the number

115. See id. at 417 (listing examples of conflicts of interest among financial
professionals, including an investment adviser’s trading for its own account
and a broker’s recommending to others the purchase of a security she owns or
having a personal interest in a particular transaction).
116. See Stephen Cecchetti & Kim Schoenholtz, Managing Risk and
Complexity: Legal Entity Identifier, VOX EU (Dec. 3, 2017),
https://perma.cc/X6B5-XUDA (describing the risk involved in several affiliated
entity structures within the investment world).
117. See, e.g., Nathan Reiff, Six Companies Owned by Bank of America,
INVESTOPEDIA (July 14, 2021), https://perma.cc/4J85-H55Y.
118. See Citywire Research Team, What Do Successful Fund Managers
Have
in
Common?,
CITYWIRE
SELECTOR
(Feb.
21,
2011),
https://perma.cc/BWX3-GENZ (“We attach a great deal of importance to
detecting the ability of equity fund managers to generate significant and
recurring outperformance at certain phases of the stock market cycle.”).
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of fund investors and the amount of their investments, and by
achieving strong fund performance.119 The two factors are
clearly related, moreover, because performance results are
perhaps the primary factor in attracting new fund investors and
additional investments from existing investors.120 Accordingly,
a manager seeking to improve performance may invest fund
assets in securities and other instruments that are riskier than
what the fund’s investment policy allows in hopes of realizing a
quick performance boost or may seek to sell poorly-performing
securities to an affiliated fund at a price that is higher than the
securities’ market value, thereby harming the affiliated fund.
Regulation of public funds and their managers, then,
reflects regulators’ assessments of how these entities are most
tempted. Moreover, in formulating the Investment Company
Act and rules under that statute over eighty years ago, Congress
and the SEC deemed it insufficient simply to instruct these
entities not to allow themselves to be tempted.121 Thus emerged
the extensive prohibitions throughout public fund regulation,
which are an effort (in the ironic words of one SEC official in
2012) to eliminate constantly-mutating “viruses”—that is,

119. Cf. James Chen, Hedge Fund Manager, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://perma.cc/75JK-K4FM (last updated Feb. 28, 2021) (explaining that
private fund managers “must consider how to have a competitive advantage,
a clearly defined investment strategy, adequate capitalization, a marketing
and sales plan, and a risk management strategy” to be successful); Citywire
Research Team, supra note 118 (“Normally, consistently outperforming
managers share a rigorous investment process which in itself is created to
generate alpha.”).
120. See Jason Zweig, Why Investors Can’t Kick the ‘Past Performance’
Habit, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2021, 10:45 AM), https://perma.cc/Z4EM-NBFL
(discussing how investors often think that past performance is “a highly
reliable indicator”). That this is the case, however, is contrary to a particular
(and apt) disclosure included in almost all presentations of fund performance,
namely, that past performance is not an indicator of future performance. See
Peter Westaway, Show Me the Proof: Is Past Performance a Good Guide to the
Future?, VANGUARD (June 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/HR7N-J3X2.
121. See James Chen, Investment Company Act of 1940, INVESTOPEDIA
(May 19, 2021), https://perma.cc/AR35-HEPY (explaining that Congress
intended the Investment Company Act of 1940 to set a regulatory framework
for investment products following the stock market crash of 1929).
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conflicts—that could otherwise pose a “mortal threat to the
body.”122
Nevertheless, sharp securities market volatility and
uncertainty create temptations anew for fund managers and
other fund affiliates. As noted above, many funds experienced
substantial investor withdrawals in the early months of the
pandemic, while, at the same time, some funds also experienced
considerable devaluations, or “drawdowns,” of the value of their
portfolio assets as market conditions worsened.123 Despite these
circumstances, the realm of public funds and their managers did
not experience pandemic-related litigation to the same extent as
in the public company context. This is likely a product of the fact
that the public fund context differs from the public company
context in two important respects.
First, the net asset value of a public fund’s shares is not
determined by whether the fund is able to continue to sell its
products or services, produce and supply the medical treatments
it is developing, or employ appropriate protocols to keep its
customers healthy and safe.124 Rather, the price of a fund’s
shares is typically based on the value of the numerous
securities—those
issued
by
other
funds
and
companies—comprising its portfolio.125 During the pandemic,
122. Carlo di Florio, Dir., Off. of Compliance Inspections & Exams., SEC,
Conflicts of Interest and Risk Governance (Oct. 22, 2012). The official’s
statement is worth noting in its entirety, as it is one of the SEC staff’s more
vivid denunciations of conflicts of interest:
[O]ne can think of ethical concepts as the white blood cells that
make an organization’s “immune system”—its compliance and risk
management systems and culture—effective. Extending that same
metaphor, conflicts of interest can be thought of as the viruses that
threaten the organization’s wellbeing. As in the microbial world,
these viruses come in a vast array of constantly mutating formats,
and if not eliminated or neutralized, even the simplest virus is a
mortal threat to the body.
Id.
123. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Anita K. Krug, Investment Company as Instrument: The
Limitations of the Corporate Governance Regulatory Paradigm, 86 S. CAL. L.
REV. 263, 298 (2013) (“[A]n investment company’s shares are valued on a daily
basis based solely on the value of the securities the investment company
holds—rather than the prospects for future appreciation in those shares.”).
125.
Id.
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however, although some funds experienced significant losses,
stock prices overall did not reflect the degree of volatility that
often spawns significant drawdowns and, beyond that, investor
litigation. Indeed, investor lawsuits in the public fund context
are more likely to arise when plaintiffs are able to make a
reasonable allegation that a fund manager has been led astray
in managing the fund’s portfolio, such as by deviating from the
fund’s established (and previously disclosed) investment policies
and guidelines.
Second, unlike in the public company context, some of the
primary enforcement tools in the investment arena are SEC
examinations and investigations, which, in turn, may lead to
so-called enforcement actions, which the SEC launches when its
investigators uncover inappropriate activity by a fund or a fund
manager.126 This reliance on the SEC as an enforcer is a
component of the sweeping regulation to which public funds and
their managers are subject.127 It may also be the cause—or,
possibly, the effect—of greater passivity among public fund
shareholders, as compared with public company shareholders,
in terms of initiating litigation against these entities.128
Regardless of the lower rate of public fund litigation arising
out of the pandemic as compared to the rate of public company
litigation, considering the adversities funds experienced—as
well as the SEC’s modified manner of conducting investigations
during the pandemic129—one might question whether any
126. See Jay Clayton et al., Statement on the Renaming of the Office of
Compliance Inspections and Examinations to the Division of Examinations,
SEC (Dec. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/TFM9-KZ5L (observing that among the
SEC’s roles is “identifying and monitoring risks, improving industry practices,
and identifying and referring misconduct” and that its enforcement function
“has promoted a strong culture of compliance within the financial services
industry”).
127. See Chen, supra note 121 (“Provisions of the Act address
requirements for filings, service charges, financial disclosures,
and . . . fiduciary duties.”).
128. However, public fund investors do sue fund managers or their boards
of directors with some regularity. The point for present purposes is that,
perhaps due to alternative enforcement mechanisms in the public fund
context, there has been somewhat less litigation arising out of the pandemic’s
effects on public funds than there has been in the public company context.
129. See OCIE Statement on Operations and Exams—Health, Safety,
Investor Protection and Continued Operations Are Our Priorities, SEC,
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regulatory leniency in this context is appropriate. After all, the
discussion above regarding conflicts of interest suggests that the
onset of the pandemic may have been an appropriate time for
the SEC to impose additional requirements, rather than fewer.
To be sure, the agency emphasized to funds and managers the
need to be especially diligent during the crisis and to provide
timely and material information to investors.130 Nevertheless,
as the next section describes, and reminiscent of the SEC’s
approach in the public company context, the SEC adopted
temporary rules to assist public funds in managing volatility
and complying with various regulatory obligations.
B.

Temporary Rules for Public Funds

In March 2020, SEC’s Division of Investment Management
began adopting temporary rules under both the Investment
Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act to provide
leniency to public funds and fund managers during the
pandemic.131 It did so for the same reasons it adopted rules
centered on public companies—to alleviate financial and
operational challenges arising from the pandemic. Moreover, as
was the case with some of the public company-centered
temporary rules, many of the “public fund” rules expired during
the summer, after a relatively short period of time.132 More
important, some of these rules were similarly worrisome
https://perma.cc/Z82H-58SZ (last updated Mar. 23, 2020) (“In light of health
and safety concerns and other circumstances, OCIE has moved to conducting
examinations off-site through correspondence, unless it is absolutely
necessary to be on-site.”).
130. See Importance of Delivering Timely and Material Information to
Investment Company Investors, SEC (Apr. 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/G5T2VSRS (emphasizing “the ongoing importance to update and deliver required
information to investors in a timely manner consistent with investment
companies’ disclosure obligations, even during this period of operational
challenge”).
131. See Jay Clayton et al., An Update on the Commission’s Targeted
Regulatory Relief to Assist Market Participants Affected by COVID-19 and
Ensure the Orderly Function of Our Markets, SEC (June 26, 2020),
https://perma.cc/8YFT-8DPQ (last updated Jan. 5, 2021) (summarizing the
Division of Investment Management’s temporary relief rules for investors,
funds, advisers, and service providers).
132. See id.
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because they softened controls in the securities laws and
associated rules to mitigate conflicts of interest that, if acted on,
could be harmful to investors.
Similar to the temporary rule pertaining to the public
company reporting requirements discussed in Part I, on March
24, 2020, the SEC adopted temporary rules providing an
additional forty-five days for public funds to submit certain
disclosure reports that were due between March 13, 2020, and
June 30, 2020, provided that they were unable to meet a filing
deadline because of circumstances relating to COVID-19.133
Specifically, under these rules a public fund could delay filing
its Form N-PORT, a quarterly report requiring disclosure
regarding, among other things, a fund’s assets and liabilities,
securities lending arrangements, recent monthly performance,
and investor withdrawals and contributions, and its Form
N-CEN, an annual report requiring disclosure of the
information reported in an N-PORT plus various other items.134
In addition, funds were allowed an additional forty-five days to
send annual and semi-annual reports to shareholders.135
133. See Order Granting Exemptions from Specified Provisions of the
Investment Company Act and Certain Rules Thereunder, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,841,
15,841–42 (Mar. 19, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 Fund Filing Rule] (setting forth
the relief and the conditions associated with a fund’s reliance on it). Although
this rule originally applied only to reports due between March 13, 2020, and
April 30, 2020, see id. at 15,841, the SEC later extended the end-date to June
30, 2020, see Order Granting Exemptions from Specified Provisions of the
Investment Company Act and Certain Rules Thereunder, 85 Fed. Reg. 17,611,
17,611 (Mar. 31, 2020) (extending the modifications).
134. See 2020 Fund Filing Rule, supra note 133, at 15,842 (stating that a
registered fund required to file a N-CEN or N-PORT “is temporarily exempt”
from filing the form).
135. See id. (requiring, as a condition of the relief, that a public fund
relying on it send the relevant report to shareholders “not later than 45 days
after the original due date and files the report [with the SEC] within 10 days
of its transmission to shareholders”). Like Forms N-PORT and N-CEN,
shareholder reports likewise contain extensive information, including
information about a fund’s portfolio holdings, financial condition, fund
expenses, executive compensation, and performance. See Adam Hayes, Annual
Report, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/W3PU-KLCV. Also
relevant for fund managers, in terms of leniency for delaying the distribution
of regularly-publicized disclosure, is a March 13, 2020, temporary rule under
which all investment advisers—a category that includes fund
managers— could delay, by up to forty-five days, the annual update filing and
delivery to clients (including any clients that might be public funds) of their
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On March 23, 2020, to assist public funds in maintaining
sufficient liquid assets to fund withdrawals, the SEC also
adopted a set of temporary rules aimed at giving certain public
funds greater leniency to borrow money from or lend money to
certain affiliates.136 For any fund, relevant affiliates for these
purposes included the fund’s manager, directors, and officers
but did not include other funds managed by the same fund
manager.137 Under one of these temporary rules, the SEC
allowed public funds to borrow money from affiliates other than
banks or other public funds, subject to certain conditions.138
Form ADV, which is the key disclosure report required of advisers, regardless
of whether they manage public funds. See Order Granting Exemptions from
Specified Provisions of the Investment Advisers Act and Certain Rules
Thereunder, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,829, 15,829 (Mar. 19, 2020) (requiring as a
condition of the relief that an investment adviser relying on it file its delayed
Form ADV “not later than 45 days after the original due date for filing or
delivery, as applicable”). Although this rule originally applied to Form ADV
filings that were due on or before April 30, 2020, see id., the SEC later changed
the period-end to June 30, 2020, see Order Granting Exemptions from
Specified Provisions of the Investment Advisers Act and Certain Rules
Thereunder, 85 Fed. Reg. 17,609, 17,609 (Mar. 30, 2020) (extending relief to
filings due on or before June 30, 2020).
136. See Order Granting Exemptions from Specified Provisions of the
Investment Company Act and Certain Rules Thereunder, 85 Fed. Reg. 17,374,
17,374 (Mar. 27, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 Borrowing & Lending Rule]
(providing, among other things, that, until June 30, 2020, a public fund may
“borrow money from any affiliated person, or affiliated person of such affiliated
person, that is not a bank and is not itself a registered investment company,”
provided it satisfies certain specified conditions).
137. Under Section 2(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act, “affiliated
person” (affiliate) of another person includes:
(A) any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding
with power to vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding voting
securities of such other person; (B) any person 5 per centum or more
of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly
owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by such other person;
(C) any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or
under common control with, such other person; (D) any officer,
director, partner, copartner, or employee of such other person; (E)
if such other person is an investment company, any investment
adviser thereof or any member of an advisory board thereof . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(3).
138. See 2020 Borrowing & Lending Rule, supra note 136, at 17,374
(setting forth the relief and the conditions associated with a fund’s reliance on
it).
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Under a second rule, the agency permitted any public fund that
was allowed to do so-called interfund lending pursuant to an
order previously granted by the SEC to make loans if the value
of those loans did not exceed 25 percent of the public fund’s net
asset value, notwithstanding any lower thresholds in the order,
and borrow or lend for any term, notwithstanding conditions in
the order limiting the term of the loans.139 Notably, under a
third rule, the SEC made this relief available to certain public
funds that had not received such an order, permitting them to
enter into lending or borrowing transactions without procuring
shareholder approval.140 Finally, to enable funds to take
advantage of this relief without violating their governing
policies, the SEC permitted public funds to deviate from their
standard policies and procedures relating to lending and
borrowing.141 Separate from, but related to, these temporary
rules, the SEC provided relief through a so-called no-action
letter to permit public funds to sell debt securities to their
affiliates to produce liquidity for purposes of funding investor
withdrawals.142
In the case of public companies, the potential delay of
important disclosures permitted by the temporary rules
139. See id. at 17,374–75 (setting forth the rule and the conditions
associated with a fund’s reliance on it).
140. See id. at 17,375 (describing the conditions associated with a fund’s
reliance on the relief).
141. See id. (providing that a public fund could “enter into otherwise lawful
lending or borrowing transactions that deviate[d] from any relevant policy
recited in its registration statement without prior shareholder approval,”
provided its board of directors had approved its doing so, until June 30, 2020).
142. See Inv. Co. Inst., SEC No-Action Letter, 2020 WL 1487147 (Mar. 26,
2020), [hereinafter 2020 Debt Security Rule] (providing that the Division of
Investment Management staff will not recommend enforcement action against
any party that buys a debt security from an affiliated public fund, subject to
certain enumerated conditions). It is also worth noting in the context of the
SEC’s liquidity-focused rules that the agency granted relief whereby a
“closed-end” public fund that suffered a decline in net asset value of more than
10 percent due to pandemic-related market conditions was not required to
suspend offering shares until it amended its prospectus, as it normally would
be required to do. Instead, the fund could continue offering shares as soon as
it filed a prospectus supplement discussing the drawdown. See Division of
Investment Management Coronavirus (COVID-19) Response FAQs, SEC,
https://perma.cc/4N5W-8Y8B (last updated Nov. 1, 2021) (describing the relief
and recommending the inclusion of various disclosures in the supplement).
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discussed in Part I is the most troublesome effect of the SEC’s
pandemic-related temporary rules applicable to public
companies. In the public fund context, the potential lag in
distributing important information to fund shareholders, the
SEC, and the public is equally worrisome. However, for the same
reason that investor litigation is more muted in the public fund
context—namely, the value of a fund’s shares is predominately
dependent on the value of the fund’s portfolio holdings rather
than statements from fund management—delayed disclosure
about a public fund is less likely to have a significant impact on
the fund’s value.
In the public fund context, the more problematic rules are
those allowing public funds to enter into borrowing and lending
arrangements with their affiliates—arrangements that are
otherwise prohibited. Indeed, financial arrangements between a
public fund and any of its fund managers or other affiliates
represent the fundamental type of conflict that the securities
laws seek to mitigate.143 The worry is especially acute during
crisis circumstances, given that such circumstances create
significant financial challenges for fund managers and other
fund affiliates, which may catalyze conflicts of interest.
To be sure, the pandemic-related temporary rules were
subject to meliorative conditions, designed to protect investors
and their invested assets. Among other things, the rules as
applied to any public fund were generally subject to the
determination by the fund’s board that entering into a
particular arrangement was in the best interest of fund
investors.144 There were also more specific conditions for certain
temporary rules. For example, the rule permitting public funds
to sell debt securities to affiliates was subject to the condition
that the purchase price be paid in cash and that, if the
purchaser-affiliate received a profit on resale of the securities, it

143. This is evidenced by, among other things, the fact that the Investment
Company Act prohibits these types of transactions altogether, rather than
merely limiting them. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (setting forth a list of
prohibited transactions between a public fund’s affiliates and the fund).
144. See, e.g., 2020 Borrowing & Lending Rule, supra note 136, at 17,374
(requiring a board to reasonably determine that borrowing is in the best
interest of the fund before it can claim an exemption from section 12(d)(3) of
the Investment Company Act).
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pay that profit to the seller public fund.145 Even so, given that
“affiliate transactions” are one of the SEC’s signal concerns
relating to conflicts of interest, the “borrowing and lending”
rules are perhaps the most surprising—and the most
problematic—among all the temporary rules that the SEC
adopted during the pandemic.146
Yet that point begs a larger question. In both the public
company and the public fund contexts, the discussions above do
not present the full picture, in the sense that they highlight only
the more troublesome pandemic-related temporary rules.
However, at least some of the temporary rules that the SEC
adopted in both contexts provided helpful regulatory leniency
without producing problematic “side effects.” Still others may,
at some point, be appropriately adopted as permanent rules to
create greater regulatory efficiency and unburden enforcement
resources, enabling the SEC and other regulators to focus on
more damaging behavior. Of course, the rules that Parts I and
II describe are limited to those deployed to address the
pandemic, which is only one of multiple crises in the past few
decades. To evaluate temporary rules more broadly, it is worth
reviewing those adopted during past crises. That is the subject
of Part III, which additionally proposes that whether a
temporary rule is appropriate for the context in which the SEC
created it—and the particular crisis challenges it is intended to
address—should not depend on ad hoc and anecdotal analysis
and judgments.

145. See 2020 Debt Security Rule, supra note 142 (stating that the SEC’s
position is based on a number of conditions and listing the conditions).
146. Third-party commentary supports this conclusion. Among others,
Erik Gordon, a University of Michigan finance professor, concluded—even
apart from the added leniency provided by the temporary rule—that “[t]here
are several potential conflicts of interest with interfund lending.” Lewis
Braham, When Funds Lend to One Another, BARRON’S (Nov. 11, 2017),
https://perma.cc/HH4G-CW5B. To be clear, these conflicts likely adversely
impact the lending fund, rather than the borrowing fund, because the lending
fund is “now like the government bailing [the borrowing fund] out” from the
risks it assumed. See id. Regarding the temporary rule, Rajib Chanda, a
partner at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, stated that “[t]his is pretty
extraordinary that the whole mutual-fund industry is able to do this,”
presumably on the basis that the rule was unexpected and may have been
among the SEC’s more immoderate rules. See Michaels et al., supra note 97.
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III. IMPROVING TEMPORARY RULEMAKING

The anecdotes that began this Article illustrate how
temporary rules can be potentially damaging to the cause of
investor protection. That is not always the case, however. Some
temporary rules are desirable because they serve the purpose of
alleviating regulatory burdens at times when regulatory
compliance is sufficiently challenging that, without such
leniency, the subjects of regulation may be at risk of violating
relevant rules. At the same time, other temporary rules are
desirable because they do the opposite—increase regulatory
obligations, whether generally or relating to certain industries
or companies.
This Part evaluates the circumstances under which both
leniency rules and stringency rules are appropriate and supplies
a schema to guide regulators in formulating temporary rules
during the next (hopefully distant) crisis. Part III.A sets the
framework for this schema by briefly discussing recent
“pan-crises”—crises that critically impacted the securities
markets on a national scale and possibly on an international
scale—and the types of temporary rules the SEC implemented
at the time to help address the risks associated with those crises.
Part III.B extracts the lessons from these market upheavals to
formulate guidance for regulators going forward. This guidance
reflects the notion that the types of temporary rules that are
appropriate for any particular crisis is partly dependent on the
nature of the crisis and the industries most affected by it.
A.

Pan-Crises, 1987–2021

This section describes fairly recent crises and the temporary
rules the SEC adopted to help manage each crisis. In doing so,
it details how each crisis differed from the most recent one, in
terms of the industries that were most affected and the types of
rules that were adopted. In chronological order, these are the
stock market crash of 1987, the bursting of the “dot-com” bubble
in 2001–2002 and simultaneous September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, the financial crisis of 2007–2009 and, of course, the
COVID-19 pandemic of 2020–2021.
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Stock Market Crash of 1987

The most significant events of the 1987 crisis occurred on
October 19, 1987, known as “Black Monday.”147 On that day, the
Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by 22.6 percent—a loss that,
to date, is the largest one-day market percentage drawdown in
history148—and
global
stock
exchanges
dropped
a
commensurately significant amount, as market participants
worldwide engaged in significant selling.149 The day also marked
the beginning of the first modern-era global financial crisis150
and led to important market reforms, including a requirement
that exchanges develop policies to temporarily halt trading
when market sell-offs occur.151 Finally, the tumultuous events
of Black Monday demonstrated that global financial markets
were connected to one another to an extent never previously
appreciated.152
The 1987 market crash was the product of many factors,
including the widespread sense among market participants that
a long “bear” market was bound to have a correction soon,
concerns about higher interest rates, and increased reliance
among traders on automated trading.153 In contrast to later

147. See Donald Bernhardt & Marshall Eckblad, Stock Market Crash of
1987, FED. RSRV. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), https://perma.cc/L4FU-D3UF
(describing how a “chain reaction of market distress” occurring on October 19,
1987, resulted in “the sharpest market downturn in the United States since
the Great Depression”).
148. See
id.;
Adam
Hayes,
Black
Monday,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://perma.cc/9DRH-S4HQ (last updated Oct. 31, 2021).
149. See Bernhardt & Eckblad, supra note 147 (noting that “[e]ven before
US markets opened for trading on Monday morning, stock markets in and
around Asia began plunging” and that “[a]dditional investors moved to
liquidate positions, and the number of sell orders vastly outnumbered willing
buyers near previous prices, creating a cascade in stock markets”).
150. Id.
151. See id. (discussing these so-called circuit-breakers).
152. See id. (“The Black Monday events served to underscore the concept
of ‘globalization,’ which was still quite new at the time, by demonstrating the
unprecedented extent to which financial markets worldwide had become
intertwined and technologically interconnected.”).
153. See
Stock
Market
Crash
of
1987,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://perma.cc/P4DS-E8R5 (last updated Jan. 22, 2021) (discussing possible
causes of the 1987 stock market crash).
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significant stock market drawdowns, there is nothing
particularly surprising about these factors, and there is no
single culprit to blame. As is the case with so many significant
market events, the crash was the product of a wildfire-like
spread of panic and speculation throughout the markets.154
More notably, the 1987 crash was the last financial crisis in
which the SEC did not adopt any temporary rules, whether of
the leniency variety or the stringency variety.
2.

Dot-Com Bubble and 9/11

The so-called dot-com bubble was a classic market bubble
that existed from 1995 to 2001—a period characterized by the
tremendous growth and use of the Internet, during which the
Nasdaq index quintupled, increasing from 1,000 to 5,000.155 Its
cause was excessive investment in Internet companies (in many
cases, regardless of their financial prospects) and these
companies’ corresponding too-rapid growth. 156 As a result,
Internet companies came to have inflated values that,
ultimately, could not be sustained.157 The bubble began to burst
in March 2001, but was not fully deflated until late 2002, when
the Nasdaq hit 1,139, a 76.81 percent drop from its peak of 5,048
in March 2000.158
The burst of the bubble and associated bankruptcy of most
Internet companies spawned the onset of a bear market that the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks only exacerbated.159 Due
154. See
James
Chen,
Stock
Market
Crash,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://perma.cc/FS67-WM3H (last updated Aug. 10, 2021) (noting that stock
market crashes are often “largely caused by investor panic”).
155. See
Adam
Hayes,
Dotcom
Bubble,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://perma.cc/UY8D-8VYD (last updated June 25, 2019).
156. See D. Quinn Mills, Who’s to Blame for the Bubble?, HARV. BUS. REV.
(May 2001), https://perma.cc/XW5X-GJKX (observing that, although “the
capital markets did a great job of channeling money into the new business
sector that the dot-coms represented,” they nevertheless “did a lousy job of
selecting which start-ups to support”).
157. See id.
158. See Hayes, supra note 155 (describing the impact of the crash on the
stock markets).
159. See, e.g., John Miley, The U.S. Economy Since 9/11, KIPLINGER (Feb.
3, 2020), https://perma.cc/W5C5-XR44 (“[T]he events of 9/11 dampened an
already weakening economy.”).
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to concerns about inevitable panic-induced market selling and a
catastrophic loss of market value, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and the Nasdaq did not open on September 11th and
remained closed until September 17, 2001.160 When trading
resumed, the Dow Jones fell by 7.1 percent the first day, and, by
the end of the week, the Nasdaq had fallen by almost 14
percent.161
Despite the one-two punch to the stock market, the SEC did
not move to implement any temporary rules until after the latter
event. The rules the agency adopted at that point consisted of
leniency rules similar to those described above in connection
with the pandemic. More specifically, these rules included ones
that, through September 28, 2001, allowed public funds to
borrow money from affiliates (except other public funds) and
entities other than banks,162 to make interfund loans pursuant
to a previously-obtained SEC order valued at up to 25 percent of
its net asset value notwithstanding any lower thresholds in the

160. See Glenn Kessler, No, President Trump, the NYSE Did Not Open the
Day After the Sept. 11 Attacks, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2018),
https://perma.cc/P6LX-N5XJ (noting that, after September 11, 2001, the U.S.
stock markets were “closed until Sept. 17—the longest shutdown since 1933”).
161. See Marc Davis, How September 11 Affected the U.S. Stock Market,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://perma.cc/M769-6573 (last updated Oct. 25, 2021)
(summarizing post-September 11, 2001, market volatility). Nevertheless,
within a month, the Dow Jones, Nasdaq, and S&P 500 indices had largely
recovered and returned to pre-September 11th price levels. See Alexandra
Twin, Wall St. Turns Around, CNN (Oct. 5, 2001, 5:29 PM),
https://perma.cc/8BAV-SLSA (detailing U.S. equity indices’ recovery in
October 2001).
162. See Order Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 Granting
Exemptions from Certain Provisions of the Act and Certain Rules Thereunder,
66 Fed. Reg. 48,721, 48,721–22 (Sept. 21, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Borrowing
& Lending Rule] (setting forth limited relief relating to borrowing from
affiliates and non-banks). Although the rule’s effective period was set to expire
five business days after the stock markets reopened, the SEC extended its
effective period to September 28, 2001. See Order Extending Prior Order
Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 Granting Exemptions from
Certain Provisions of the Act and Certain Rules Thereunder, 66 Fed. Reg.
49,437, 49,438 (Sept. 27, 2001).
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order,163 and to deviate from their governing policies with
respect to borrowing and lending.164
Under another temporary rule, the SEC afforded public
companies greater ability, through September 28, 2001, to
repurchase their own securities,165 a transaction that is thought
to give rise to market manipulation risks.166 For context, public
companies may wish to pursue stock repurchases in volatile
market environments for a number of reasons, including that
doing so may help maintain the price of their stock, which may
be undervalued in these environments.167 The temporary rule
the SEC adopted after September 11th permitted companies to
repurchase their own securities—even if the repurchases did not
satisfy the requirements of Securities Exchange Act rule
10b-18168 (which is aimed at preventing manipulative
repurchases)—without being deemed to violate relevant
antifraud rules.169

163. See 2001 Borrowing & Lending Rule, supra note 162 (setting forth
limited relief relating to public funds’ use of interfund lending arrangements).
164. See id. (allowing public funds to enter into borrowing transactions
that may “deviate from any relevant policy recited in its registration
statement”).
165. See Emergency Order Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, 66 Fed.
Reg. 48,494, 48,494 (Sept. 20, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Repurchase Rule]
(setting forth the relief and the conditions associated with a company’s
reliance on it). Although the rule was to have expired five business days after
the stock markets reopened, the SEC extended the effective period to
September 28, 2001. See Order Extending Emergency Order Pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to
Market Developments, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,438, 49,438 (Sept. 27, 2001).
166. See Jerry Useem, The Stock-Buyback Swindle, ATLANTIC,
https://perma.cc/E7AJ-NCCU (last updated July 26, 2019, 2:08 PM)
(“[A]nalysis revealed that in the eight days following a buyback
announcement, executives on average sold five times as much stock as they
had on an ordinary day.”).
167. See id. (“By reducing the number of shares outstanding in the market,
a buyback lifts the price of each remaining share.”).
168. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18 (2018).
169. See 2001 Repurchase Rule, supra note 165 (providing that a public
company that has met certain conditions listed in Rule 10b-18 will not be
deemed to have violated the Exchange Act’s antifraud prohibitions based
solely on the time, price, amount purchased, or the brokers or dealers used
when repurchases were made).
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Beyond these temporary rules, the SEC adopted a few
others directed at particular entities or individuals or relating
to certain “one-off” circumstances. Under one such rule, the
agency granted leniency to the American Stock Exchange in
light of its temporary need to use the NYSE’s trading floor after
its own was damaged during the September 11th attacks.170
Another one, directed at all U.S. stock exchanges, extended a
previously-issued deadline for the exchanges’ required
submissions of certain price-related information.171
The overall picture of the agency’s post-September 11th
rulemaking, then, is one of measured leniency to help public
companies and public funds manage a period of substantial
market volatility after the terrorist attacks. To be sure, it did
not adopt any temporary rules specifically to temper the impact
of the dot-com crash. However, the fact that, at the time of the
terrorist attacks, Internet companies were already in a tailspin
and having a sizable impact on the market in general arguably
contributed to the severity of the post-September 11th volatility
that the markets experienced.
3.

2007–2009 Financial Crisis

The financial crisis that began in the latter half of 2007 and
stretched into 2009 marked the abrupt end of a heady period of
cheap credit that allowed speculators and investors to put at
risk more capital than they possessed—or could ever pay back,
in the event their risk-taking was ultimately unprofitable.172
Fortunately for them, or so they thought, they would never need
170. See Emergency Order Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments
Concerning the American Stock Exchange, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,493, 48,493 (Sept.
20, 2001) (allowing the Exchange to have specialists serve as floor brokers
during the relocation period in light of its temporary relocation and the need
for it to operate with limited staffing).
171. See Order Extending the Deadline to Submit Rule Filings Concerning
the Implementation of Decimal Pricing in Equity Securities and Options
Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,983, 49,984
(Oct. 1, 2001) (extending a May 22, 2001, order deadline to January 14, 2002).
172. See Manoj Singh, The 2007–08 Financial Crisis in Review,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://perma.cc/9ZJX-ZS7M (last updated Nov. 27, 2021) (“By
the summer of 2007, financial markets around the world were showing signs
that the reckoning was overdue for a years-long binge on cheap credit.”).
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to pay off their borrowings because there always seemed to be
more capital to borrow, allowing them to cover whatever they
might eventually owe.173 However, the worst financial upheaval
since the Great Depression ensued, overwhelming the global
financial system; bringing down stalwart financial institutions,
including Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers; draining the
financial accounts of ordinary individuals; and costing millions
of jobs.174
Among the primary causes of the crisis175 were extremely
low interest rates that led to a housing bubble worldwide.176
Home prices rose steeply and quickly as homebuyers took
advantage of the low rates and easy-to-get money.177 In this
context, moreover, “homebuyers” included those with low credit
ratings, otherwise known as subprime borrowers.178 This was
possible because, by extending credit to these buyers, lenders
incurred no risk themselves. Rather, they sold that risk by

173. This was, in large part, due to government policy. See Christopher
Caldwell, Opinion, Bloomberg Is Right About the 2008 Financial Crash, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/2M3C-UVLG. After the 2001 recession,
“both Democratic and Republican leadership” at the national level pursued
“reckless government extension of credit,” which, as a policy for addressing
economic downturns, had “practical advantages,” including “large, positive,
immediate, and widely distributed benefits, whereas the costs all lie in the
future.” Id.
174. See Singh, supra note 172 (describing the effects of the financial crisis
on institutions, individuals, and the economy).
175. For a discussion of the role that credit default swaps played in causing
the financial crisis, see Anita K. Krug, Investing and Pretending, 100 IOWA L.
REV. 1559, 1573–77 (2015).
176. See Caldwell, supra note 173 (“[The 2007–2009 financial crisis] was
brought about by a flawed attempt to use credit markets to broaden access to
housing.”).
177. See Paul Davidson et al., It May Feel Like 2008 All Over Again, But
Here’s How the Coronavirus Crisis Is Different, USA TODAY (Mar. 11, 2020,
12:01 AM), https://perma.cc/A375-7RCX (last updated Mar. 11, 2020, 3:17 PM)
(observing that the 2007–2009 financial crisis “was set off by an overheated
housing market,” in which “[b]anks and other lenders approved
mortgages— including many to buyers who weren’t qualified, driving up home
prices to stratospheric levels”).
178. See John V. Duca, Subprime Mortgage Crisis, FED. RSRV. HIST. (Nov.
22, 2013), https://perma.cc/93VC-YFNV (“The subprime mortgage crisis of
2007–10 stemmed from an earlier expansion of mortgage credit, including to
borrowers who previously would have had difficulty getting mortgages . . . .”).
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selling the loans to financial institutions, which “securitized”
them—that is, packaged them together into pools of various
types of financial instruments, including collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs) and other mortgage-backed securities.179
The sponsoring financial institutions then sold interests in these
pools to investors, marketing them as having limited risk
(especially the higher-quality segments of the pool), largely
because the pools marginalized and diluted the credit risk of any
particular subprime borrower.180 Credit rating agencies’
too-rosy assessments of the risks associated with these
securities may have further prompted investors’ eager
accumulation of them.181
This state of affairs could not last forever, hanging as it did
from the slim reed of low interest rates.182 Additionally, when
the downturn came, it was seemingly much worse than most
observers had predicted.183 Neither they nor market
participants had adequately accounted for the fact that the same
collateral had been used to secure multiple loans system-wide184
179. See Edward J. Schoen, The 20072009 Financial Crisis: An Erosion
of Ethics: A Case Study, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS 805, 813 (2016) (noting that
securitizing housing loans into mortgage-backed securities “separated the
lender from the risk of default, which was transferred to investors
downstream”).
180. See id. at 813–14 (“Because the mortgages were pooled, the risk from
defaults was spread throughout the pool. . . .”); Liz Moyer, The Toxic Alphabet
Soup that Almost Took Down Wall Street Is Staging a Comeback, CNBC (Sept.
19, 2018, 7:32 AM), https://perma.cc/8VJ4-95VV (last updated Sept. 19, 2018,
8:26 AM) (“CDOs were sold as instruments that could contain risk while
providing high income.”);
181. See The Credit Rating Controversy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.,
https://perma.cc/M2NW-XTD5 (last updated Feb. 19, 2015, 7:00 AM) (“Raters
deemed many of these structured products top-tier AAA material during the
housing boom, only to sharply downgrade them when the housing market
collapsed.”).
182. See Singh, supra note 172 (detailing the timeline of the 2007–2009
financial crisis).
183. See id. (“[F]ew investors suspected that the worst crisis in nearly eight
decades was about to engulf the global financial system, bringing Wall Street’s
giants to their knees and triggering the Great Recession.”).
184. See Janet L. Yellen, Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk: Lessons
from the Financial Crisis and Policy Implications, FED. RSRV. BD. (Jan. 4,
2013), https://perma.cc/4UZ2-87TB (“At first, the damage appeared to be
contained, but the resulting stresses revealed extensive interconnections
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or recognized the extent to which counterparties to credit
default swaps were tightly bound with one another in
interlinking chains of bets such that one large counterparty’s
need to extricate itself would destroy the whole web and every
counterparty comprising it.185
These are only some of the factors contributing to the
financial crisis. For present purposes, the noteworthy aspect of
the crisis is that most of the temporary rules that the SEC
adopted at that time were intended not to provide leniency, but
rather to prevent additional damage at the hands of those who
might aim to profit off of the near-rubble of the financial
system.186 These rules, in other words, were almost exclusively
stringency rules, and they almost exclusively revolved around
the practice of short-selling.187
among traditional banks, investment houses, and the rapidly growing and less
regulated shadow banking sector.”).
185. See id.
186. There are a few exceptions to this statement. First, the SEC adopted
a temporary rule allowing public companies to repurchase their own securities,
see Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(K)(2) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments,
Exchange Act Release No. 58,588, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,174 (Sept. 24, 2008), which
was similar to a temporary rule relating to repurchases that it had adopted
during the 2001 crisis, see supra notes 126–132 and accompanying text.
Second, it adopted a handful of other leniency rules pertaining to financial
institutions involved with the credit default swap market. See, e.g., Order
Pursuant to Section 36 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Granting
Temporary Exemptions from Sections 5 and 6 of the Exchange Act for
Broker-Dealers and Exchanges Effecting Transactions in Credit Default
Swaps, Exchange Act Release No. 59,165, 74 Fed. Reg. 133, 135 (Dec. 24, 2008)
(granting, among other things, a temporary exemption to exchanges that
effected or reported transactions in certain types of credit default swaps from
the requirement of registering as a national securities exchange).
187. In a short sale, a trader sells a security that she does not own in the
open market, in hopes that the security’s price will thereafter decline. See
Matthew Lewis, A Transatlantic Dilemma: A Comparative Review of American
and British Hedge Fund Regulation, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 347, 358 (2008).
In a “covered” short sale, the trader has borrowed, or arranged to borrow, the
security from a broker or others prior to the sale to deliver it to the buyer on
the settlement date for the transaction, whereas in a “naked” short sale, the
trader will not have done this. See Adam Hayes, Naked Shorting,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://perma.cc/N54J-TFQQ (last updated June 1, 2021)
(stating that naked short sales involve “selling shares that have not been
affirmatively determined to exist”). After some time has elapsed, the trader
will buy in the open market the same amount of the same security that she
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The first among the set of short-sale rules, which the SEC
adopted on July 15, 2008, prohibited most market participants
from effecting “naked short sales.”188 More specifically, the rule,
effective through August 12, 2008,189 prohibited a market
participant from executing a short sale involving the securities
of a designated institution unless the trader had borrowed or
arranged to borrow the relevant security or otherwise “ha[d] the
security available in its inventory to borrow” prior to executing
the short sale.190 By requiring market participants to “locate”
the relevant securities prior to selling a stock short, the rule
ensured that the securities would be available for delivery to the
buyer on the settlement date.191 The SEC believed the rule was
necessary based on its assessment that, in light of the events up
to then, which included Bear Stearns’s bankruptcy, there was a

sold (and therefore borrowed) and will give those shares to the lender, to repay
her loan. See Lewis, supra note 187, at 357–59 (describing various hedge fund
investment strategies). If all goes well and the security declined in value, the
trader’s profit will be the difference between the security’s market price at the
time of the sale and the market price at the time the trader later buys the
security to return to the lender. See id.
188. See Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(K)(2) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market
Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 58,166, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,379 (July 15,
2008) [hereinafter 2008 Short Sale Rule] (setting forth limitations on effecting
short sales). In an amendment to this rule, the SEC excepted market makers
and certain other market participants from this prohibition. See Amendment
to Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(K)(2) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments,
Exchange Act Release No. 58,190, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,837, 42,838 (July 18, 2008)
(permitting “market makers to facilitate customer orders . . . without possible
delays associated with complying with the borrow and arrangement-to-borrow
requirement of the Order”).
189. Although the original rule provided that it would expire on July 29,
2008, see 2008 Short Sale Rule, supra note 188, at 42,379, the SEC later
extended the effective period, setting August 12, 2008, as the new expiration
date. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
190. See 2008 Short Sale Rule, supra note 188, at 42,379 (prohibiting short
sales of securities in designated financial institutions “unless [the seller] has
borrowed or arranged to borrow the security or otherwise has the security
available to borrow in its inventory prior to effecting such short sale and
delivers the security on settlement date”).
191. See id.
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significant risk of “sudden and excessive” volatility in the
securities markets due to the spread of false rumors.192
The SEC followed its short-sale prohibition with additional
temporary rules pertaining to short sales, largely based on the
same concerns that led it to adopt the rule pertaining to
financial institutions.193 According to the agency, traders
continued to take advantage of companies whose financial
condition had deteriorated temporarily by inappropriately
“shorting” those companies’ securities.194 The resulting and
sudden price declines in these stocks, it noted, could lead to
questions about the companies’ financial conditions, in turn
causing a possible crisis of confidence that could impair the
companies’ viability and further erode confidence in the
markets.195
Due to these ongoing concerns, the SEC adopted still other
temporary rules. First, on September 17, 2008, the SEC
effectively expanded the “financial institutions” short-sale rule,
which had expired,196 by adopting another rule covering short
sales of the securities of all companies, not just financial

192. See id. (observing that the events preceding the sale of Bear Stearns
illustrate the dangerous market impact of rumors, that previous SEC actions
were intended to disincentivize market manipulation through false rumor
dissemination, and that additional action was needed to prevent market
disruption).
193. See Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(K)(2) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market
Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 58,572, 73 Fed. Reg. 54,875 (Sept.
18, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Enhanced Delivery Requirements Rule] (citing
concerns about “unfounded rumors” surrounding the stability of the financial
system).
194. See id. (observing that the SEC “continues to be concerned that there
is a substantial threat of sudden and excessive fluctuations of securities
prices” and that “some persons may take advantage of issuers that have
become temporarily weakened by current market conditions to engage in
inappropriate short selling”).
195. See id. (noting that the price declines can “give rise to questions about
the underlying financial condition of an issuer, which in turn can create a crisis
of confidence without a fundamental underlying basis” that can “impair the
liquidity and ultimate viability of an issuer”).
196. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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institutions.197 In addition, this rule, effective through October
17, 2008,198 was aimed at a different group of participants in
short-sale transactions, namely broker-dealers and participants
of registered clearing agencies that assist short sellers in
executing their trades.199 Under the rule’s operative provision,
any such firm or individual that had a fail-to-deliver position in
an equity security at any clearing agency would be subject to a
penalty.200
Second, at the same time, the SEC adopted a naked
short-selling antifraud rule, deeming it a “manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance” for anyone to deceive any
participant (including the purchaser) in connection with
executing a short sale regarding the trader’s ability or intention
to deliver the security by the settlement date and then actually
fail to deliver the security.201 Third, on September 18, 2008, the
197. See 2008 Enhanced Delivery Requirements Rule, supra note 193, at
54,876 (“We have concluded that it is necessary to impose enhanced delivery
requirements on sales of all equity securities . . . .”).
198. Originally set to terminate on October 1, 2008, the SEC later
extended the effective period to October 17, 2008. See Order Extending
Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(K)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments,
Exchange Act Release No. 58,711, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,698 (Oct. 1, 2008)
[hereinafter 2008 Penalty Rule Extension] (“[E]xtending the Order is in the
public interest and necessary to maintain fair and orderly securities markets
and for the protection of investors.”).
199. See Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(K)(2) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market
Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 58,572, 73 Fed. Reg. 54,876 (Sept.
17, 2008). Id. at 54,875 (“The temporary rule imposes a penalty on any
participant of a registered clearing agency, and any broker-dealer from which
it receives trades for clearance and settlement, for having a fail to deliver
position at a registered clearing agency in any equity security.”).
200. See id. (predicting that this “emergency requirement [would]
significantly reduce any possibility that ‘naked’ short selling may contribute
to the disruption of markets in these securities”). A participant of a registered
clearing agency is an intermediary in making payments or deliveries in a
securities transaction. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(23)(A).
201. Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(K)(2) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market
Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 58,572, 73 Fed. Reg. at 54,877.
Similar to the “penalty” rule covering broker-dealers or clearing agency
participants, see supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text, the SEC
changed the original termination date of this rule from October 1, 2008, to
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agency adopted a new, more sweeping prohibition on short sales
directed at financial institutions that prohibited not only naked
short sales involving these entities but also all other short sales
involving them.202 This temporary rule, effective through
October 2, 2008, included substantially more financial
institutions on the no-short list than did its predecessor.203
Fourth, and also on September 18, 2008, the SEC adopted a
temporary rule requiring investment advisers that qualify as
“institutional investment managers”204 to report their
short-selling activity to the SEC on a weekly basis through
October 17, 2008.205
Given the severity of the financial crisis and the nature of
the SEC’s post-9/11 temporary rules, one might have expected
the agency to have addressed the financial crisis by adopting a
range of broadly-applicable temporary rules to assist public
companies and public funds as they maneuvered through the
October 17, 2008. See 2008 Penalty Rule Extension, supra note 198, at 58,698
(“[E]xtending the Order is in the public interest and necessary to maintain fair
and orderly securities markets and for the protection of investors.”).
202. See Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(K)(2) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market
Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 58,592, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,169, 55,170
(Sept. 18, 2008) (providing that “all persons are prohibited from short selling
any publicly traded securities” of any designated financial firm).
203. See id. at 55,170 (“Our concerns are no longer limited to the financial
institutions that were the subject of the July Emergency Order.”). Although
the SEC did not number the institutions on the list either time, the list
attached to its July rule release was less than one page, while the one attached
to the September rule release was five pages.
204. “Institutional investment managers” are investment advisers who
exercise investment discretion over accounts holding securities collectively
worth at least $100 million. 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
205. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Emergency Order Pursuant to
Section 12(K)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Taking Temporary
Action to Respond to Market Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 58,591,
73 Fed. Reg. 55,175, 55,176 (Sept. 18, 2008) (requiring institutional
investment managers to report “on the first business day of every calendar
week immediately following a week in which it effected short sales”). Although
the rule was set to expire on October 2, 2008, see id., the SEC later extended
the effective period to October 17, 2008. See Amendment to Order and Order
Extending Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(K)(2) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market
Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 58,724, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,987 (Oct. 2,
2008).
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challenging markets. Instead, the agency evinced an almost
single-minded focus on preventing opportunistic short selling
activities that targeted financial firms, adopting a variety of
stringency rules intended to achieve this goal.206 This approach
not only seems to have served market participants’ needs at the
time; it also provides insights for purposes of discerning a few
principles from the agency’s temporary rulemaking to date, to
guide its future temporary rulemaking.
B.

Lessons for Temporary Rulemaking

The discussions above suggest that the need for effective
regulation, as well as some leniency, is never greater than in
times of crisis. However, some of the SEC’s rulemaking to
address the circumstances of the pandemicwhile undoubtedly
providing needed regulatory relief for many public companies
and public fundsnevertheless may have exacerbated the risk
of fraud. For example, under these rules, public funds affected
by market volatility during the pandemic were permitted to
enter into borrowing and lending arrangements with
affiliates—activities that are otherwise prohibited due to the
associated conflicts of interest.207 Because crises do not abate
those conflicts of interest, the risk arises that the terms of any
such loan might advantage the lender to the detriment of the
borrower or vice versa. In addition, in the public company
context, firms could delay making certain public disclosures
under certain conditions, allowing investors to remain unaware
of critical information for a longer period than they otherwise
would.208
Risks to investors are especially acute in crisis
circumstances.209 Insofar as the securities markets are
concerned, crises are severe episodes of volatility. Public
company stock prices often decrease sharply, regardless of the
actual financial prospects of the companies at issue, while public
206. See supra notes 186–205 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 102–107 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
209. See Adam Hayes, Investing in Crisis: A High-Risk, High-Reward
Strategy, INVESTOPEDIA, https://perma.cc/6WBQ-JW8N (last updated Oct. 28,
2020) (contending that the possibility of a double-dip recession, as well as the
uncertainty of a recovery, make investments risky).
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funds, whose portfolios largely consist of the securities of public
companies, suffer significant decreases in net asset values and
investor withdrawals. In these situations, those who manage
public companies, as well as managers of public funds, may be
tempted to take advantage of weakened firms or affiliated
entities (a situation that stringency rules help prevent) or do
whatever is feasible to preserve themselves (a situation aided by
leniency rules). In effect, crises often force market actors into
corners.210 They do so, however, in different ways and to
different degrees, depending on the actors’ particular
situations.211
This insight should inform the SEC’s—and, undoubtedly,
other regulators’—temporary rulemaking in crisis situations
going forward. In the SEC’s temporary rule releases and orders
to date, the agency has not heeded the ways that the crisis at
hand may differ from previous crises. Its failure to do so is
evident in its rulemaking after September 11, 2001, as
compared with its rulemaking to address the 2020 pandemic, in
that some of the temporary rules it adopted during each crisis
were substantially similar to one another. Perhaps that is
because the crises might likewise seem similar, in the sense that
neither of them originated with market upheaval, unlike the
1987 and 2007–2009 crises. Instead, for both crises, cause and
effect were reversed: an event unrelated to the
markets—terrorist attacks, in one case; and a global pandemic,
in the other—caused the market upheaval.
There are significant differences between the two
crises—differences that are far more relevant for temporary
rulemaking than whether a market downturn was the cause of
the crisis or whether it was the effect. A primary one is that,
after September 11, 2001, there was no distinction among
industries regarding the relative market-related effects of the

210. See Frederic S. Mishkin, Anatomy of a Financial Crisis, 7–12 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch. Working Paper No. 3934, 1991), https://perma.cc/M6CC4CRY (listing bank panics, for example, as one such crisis situation).
211. See id. at 2–8 (describing how the asymmetrical information available
to borrowers and lenders can cause a financial crisis to affect borrowers and
lenders to different degrees).

TEMPORARY SECURITIES REGULATION

237

catastrophe.212 The markets were shut down for days.213 When
they reopened on September 17, 2001, industries broadly shared
declines in stock prices214—an unsurprising circumstance, given
that, at that very early stage, there was much to be determined
about the terrorist attacks, including the country’s actions in
response to them.215
This was not the case during the pandemic, however,
because only some industries were directly engaged in the
pandemic response. And some industries were more heavily
affected by the pandemic than others, as various shareholder
class action claims illustrate. Shareholders sought recourse
from cruise operators and airlines based on the allegation that
the companies did not maintain adequate protocols to protect
their customers while publicly claiming otherwise; against
health care and pharmaceutical companies based on the
allegation that they fraudulently touted developing vaccines,
diagnostic tests, and therapeutics that ultimately did not
materialize; and against technology companies based on the
allegation that they misrepresented their video meeting
platform’s
adequacy
for
protecting
users’
personal
information.216 In short, from a shareholder risk perspective,
some industries during the pandemic were more relevant than
others.
This difference between the 2001 and 2020 crises has
implications for temporary rulemaking. The rules adopted to
address the exigencies of both crises had universal application,
in the sense that they applied to all public funds and all public

212. See Marc Davis, The Impact of 9/11 on Business, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://perma.cc/WQ3Q-C4AJ (last updated July 12, 2021) (“Stock markets
immediately nosedived, and almost every sector of the economy was damaged
economically.”).
213. Kessler, supra note 160.
214. See id. (“The market plunged 7 percent [after September 11th].”).
215. For a discussion on the events that transpired on 9/11, see Phillip
Zelikow et al., The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 9/11 COMM’N (July
22, 2004), https://perma.cc/E8LK-DHJL (PDF).
216. See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
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companies, as the case may be.217 In the case of the 2020
pandemic, however, the SEC should have weighed the
competing interests of helping companies manage the
challenges arising from the pandemic, on the one hand, and
maintaining, if not bolstering, investor protections, on the other.
In other words, crises that affect certain industries more
severely than others may necessitate more precision by the SEC
in crafting temporary rules. Yet, in 2020, there was no
regulatory acknowledgement of the fundamental differences
between two disparate crises, separated by eighteen years, each
of which created a need for temporary rules.
Temporary leniency rules, that is. By contrast, as the
2007–2009 financial crisis was blossoming, the SEC recognized
that the adoption of leniency rules was generally not the
appropriate approach for addressing the crisis.218 This was
perhaps because, unlike the crisis arising from the 2001
terrorist attacks, the 2007–2009 crisis was caused by
market-related factors—namely, the bursting of a credit bubble
that had spread far-and-wide throughout the national and
international economies.219 In this context, the SEC aptly
discerned that the financial industry was at risk of being taken
advantage of, given the viability challenges it was experiencing
as a result of having over-leveraged itself.220 The particular
stringency rules that the agency adopted—which largely
consisted of restrictions on effecting short sales of the stocks of
financial companies—were intended to address the survival risk
that companies in this industry were experiencing.221
Accordingly, unlike the leniency rules the SEC would later
217. See Clayton et al., supra note 131 (describing the temporary relief for
public companies in response to COVID-19); supra notes 162–166 and
accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 186–187 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 175–185 and accompanying text.
220. See 2008 Short Sale Rule, supra note 188, at 42,379 (citing the
proliferation of rumors that financial institutions were facing liquidity
problems as the basis for emergency restrictions on naked short sales); 2008
Enhanced Delivery Requirements Rule, supra note 193, at 54,876 (citing the
same as the basis for enhanced delivery requirements).
221. See, e.g., 2008 Short Sale Rule, supra note 188, at 42,379 (observing
that Bear Stearns and other “significant financial institutions” had been
subject to the dissemination of false rumors that threatened substantial
market disruption).
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adopt during the 2020 pandemic, the financial crisis rules also
reflected the precision that the agency’s 2020 leniency rules
lacked, applicable as the latter were to all public companies and
all public funds, as the case may be.
Pulling these considerations together, recent crises have
demonstrated that the SEC has pursued a course of
implementing temporary rules in crisis situations, after having
declined to do so in response to the 1987 market crash.
Fortunately, although events constituting “crises” have not
frequently arisen since then, the ones that have arisen have
presented a mix of circumstances that lend themselves to
evaluating how the SEC has approached crisis-related
temporary rulemaking. That they do so opens the path to
formulating guidelines for temporary rulemaking in the context
of crises yet to come. The primary guideline that the agency
ought to heed in future crisis situations is to formulate rules
based on the unique circumstances of specific industries affected
by the crisis at issue. Although it did so during the 2007–2009
financial crisis by adopting stringency rules designed to protect
financial institutions—which were not only a significant
contributor to the occurrence of the crisis but were also suffering
the most from it—it failed to do so in enacting leniency rules to
aid companies struggling from market upheaval during the
2020 pandemic. However, the pandemic makes evident that the
need for precision, for balancing interests, may be necessary in
both leniency and stringency contexts.
This should not be surprising. Recall that leniency rules,
including those enacted during the pandemic, provide
exceptions to or modifications of particular regulatory strictures
to alleviate regulatory challenges that may otherwise subject
companies and funds to regulatory penalties.222 In non-crisis
circumstances, these penalties might be imposed, for example,
if an entity is unable to file reports in a timely manner or, in the
case of a public fund, if it lacks sufficient capital to fund investor
withdrawals.223 Presumably the same types of considerations
should inform how both stringency rules and leniency rules are
formulated. In the leniency context, the question should be
which industries, or even companies, should be excepted from
222.
223.

See supra notes 131–135 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 136–138 and accompanying text.
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the rule (for example, the travel industry or the pharmaceutical
and health care industry in 2020). In the stringency context, the
question should be—and, as the financial crisis demonstrates,
has been—which industries should the rules specifically target
(for example, the financial industry in 2008). There is nothing
about leniency rules that precludes more targeted application,
and, indeed, the nature of rulemaking amid a crisis arguably
requires it, given the different circumstances surrounding each
crisis and each market participant.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL TEMPORARY RULES
The previous Parts of this Article explore the stringency
and leniency temporary rules that the SEC adopted during
significant recent market crises and how such rules may be
made more protective of investors in future crises. Yet
crisis-related temporary rules not only present challenges to the
cause of investor protection. As this Part discusses, they present
opportunities, as well.
All temporary rules—those in both the public company
context and the public fund context—are intended to enable
firms and funds to successfully navigate the myriad difficulties
arising from the relevant crisis. However, perhaps surprisingly,
some of these rules are more effective than those they were
temporarily enacted to override. Accordingly, as challenging as
crises are for market participants, they also provide a stage for
regulatory experimentation and, possibly, improvement. Part
IV.A sets forth some of the temporary rules adopted during the
pandemic that continue to enhance certain market participants’
operations, while Part IV.B contends that these temporary
rules, which promote greater efficiency in an inefficient
securities regulatory system, should permanently replace their
“overridden” counterparts.
A.

Efficiency-Enhancing Rulemaking

At the same time that city and statewide “lockdowns”
spread across the United States and internationally, the SEC
recognized that certain requirements under the securities laws
and its associated rules were not appropriate, given social
distancing and lockdown mandates. Indeed, compliance with
some requirements was simply not possible. Eliminating this
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impossible situation was the basis of the SEC’s adoption of a
number of temporary rules during the pandemic.
One of the “more problematic” requirements provides that
it is unlawful for a public fund’s board of directors to enter into
an agreement for the provision of fund management or
underwriting services to a public fund unless a majority of the
board’s independent directors has approved the agreement at an
in-person board meeting.224 This requirement, contained in the
Investment Company Act, dates back to the 1940 enactment of
the statute.225 Similarly, the statute provides that a public
fund’s board of directors must approve the fund’s independent
auditor at an in-person board meeting.226 Further, pursuant to
an SEC rule under the Investment Company Act, an entity may
serve as fund manager of a public fund under an interim
management agreement only if the interim agreement has been
approved by a majority of the board’s independent directors at
an in-person board meeting before termination of the previous
agreement.227 Finally, under another SEC rule, which is
applicable only to so-called open-end public funds, a public fund
may act as a “distributor” of its own shares—meaning that it
may compensate other parties out of its own assets for
marketing and promoting its shares—only if, among other
things, the distribution plan and all associated agreements have
been approved by a majority of the board of directors at, yes, an
in-person board meeting.228
224. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (requiring that a public fund board of
directors approve a fund management agreement or an underwriting
agreement “in person at a meeting called for the purpose of voting on such
approval”).
225. See id. (enacted Aug. 22, 1940).
226. See id. (requiring that a public fund board of directors select the fund’s
independent public accountant “in person at a meeting called for the purpose
of voting on such approval”).
227. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.15a-4(b)(2)(ii) (2021) (providing that, to appoint
an interim fund manager, a public fund board of directors must meet “in
person to approve the interim contract before the previous contract is
terminated”).
228. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1(b)(2) (2021) (providing that a public fund
may serve as the distributor of the shares that it issues, provided that its board
of directors has approved the distribution plan and associated agreements “in
person at a meeting called for the purpose of voting on such plan or
agreements”).
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For most public funds, the SEC’s rules require that, even
after the board of directors initially approves a public fund’s
management agreement and its distribution plan and
associated agreements, those critical items must be reapproved
on an annual basis.229 Given these requirements, the boards of
most public funds include these processes as agenda items for
their quarterly board meetings once a year.230 As a result, even
had the pandemic’s wrath endured for only a month or two,
temporary relief for public funds and their boards regarding
in-person meeting requirements was critical.
In response, the SEC adopted temporary rules under which
fund boards were relieved from the in-person meeting
requirements described above until August 15, 2020,231 with the
agency later extending the effective period to December 31,
2020,232 and then indefinitely.233 The conditions for a board’s
229. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.15a-2 (2021) (providing that a fund management
agreement must be approved annually after the initial two years); 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.12b-1(b)(2) (2021) (requiring that a fund’s distribution plan and
associated agreements be approved in person on an annual basis).
230. See FIDELITY INVS., ANNUAL REPORT 44 (2021) (“Each year, the Board of
Trustees, including the Independent Trustees (together, the Board), votes on the
renewal of the management contract with Fidelity Management & Research
Company LLC (FMR) and the sub-advisory agreements (together, the Advisory
Contracts) for the fund.”); BLACKROCK, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 21 (2020)
(“BlackRock also manages its US mutual funds, closed-end and exchange-traded
funds under management contracts that must be renewed and approved annually
by the funds’ respective boards of directors, a majority of whom are independent
from the Company.”).
231. See Order Under Section 6(c) and Section 38(a) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 Granting Exemptions from Specified Provisions of the
Investment Company Act and Certain Rules Thereunder; Commission
Statement Regarding Prospectus Delivery, Investment Company Act Release
No. 33,824, 85 Fed. Reg. 17,611, 17,612 (Mar. 30, 2020) [hereinafter 2020
Board Meeting Rule] (providing a suspension of in-person board meeting
requirements under the Investment Company Act and associated SEC rules).
232. See Order Under Section 6(c) and Section 38(a) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 Granting Exemptions from Sections 15(c) and 32(a) of
the Investment Company Act and Rules 12b-1(b)(2) and 15a-4(b)(2)(ii)
Thereunder, Investment Company Act Release No. 33,897, 85 Fed. Reg.
38,467, 38,468 (June 26, 2020) (providing that the temporary relief from the
in-person voting requirement would terminate “no earlier than December 31,
2020”).
233. See Jay Clayton et al., An Update on the Commission’s Targeted
Regulatory Relief to Assist Market Participants Affected by COVID-19 and
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reliance on these rules are that the reliance is necessary because
of circumstances related to COVID-19; the board casts votes
that must otherwise be cast at an in-person meeting instead
using a means of communication that permits all directors to
hear one another simultaneously; and the board ratifies any
actions taken in reliance on the temporary rule at its next
in-person meeting.234 With this permission, throughout 2020
and into 2021, public fund boards have held their quarterly and
special board meetings on online platforms such as Zoom,
Google Meet, Microsoft Teams, and others, even when matters
otherwise requiring in-person approvals have been on the
agenda.
In another set of temporary rules that are less significant,
the SEC provided relief to permit public companies and public
funds to convey or distribute certain types of requests, forms,
and reports via email rather than through physical mailing.235
Similar to the temporary rules suspending in-person
decision-making requirements for public fund boards of
directors, these rules are also reflective of the widespread use
and reliability of technology that simply did not exist at the time
that Congress and the SEC adopted the securities laws and most
of the rules under those laws. As such, for the sake of more
efficient regulation, it is worth considering whether any of these
temporary rules should supplant the ones they are temporarily
suspending.

Ensure the Orderly Function of Our Markets, SEC (June 26, 2020),
https://perma.cc/2MRK-3S8Y (last updated Jan. 5, 2021) (stating that “[t]he
relief will remain in effect until it is terminated by staff action” on the basis
that “restrictions and concerns relating to travel are likely to continue for some
time”).
234. See 2020 Board Meeting Rule, supra note 231 (relaxing the in-person
voting requirements).
235. See, e.g., Division of Corporation Finance Statement Regarding
Requirements for Form 144 Paper Filings in Light of COVID-19 Concerns, SEC
(Apr. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/22JN-3SVU (stating that the SEC Division of
Corporate Finance would not pursue an enforcement action if Forms 144 “are
submitted via email in lieu of mailing or delivering the paper form to the
SEC”).
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B.

Toward Better (Permanent) Regulation

This Article has argued that the SEC’s temporary
rulemaking during times of crisis is worthy of scholarly
attention. That the topic has largely been ignored is presumably
a product of the fact that, although temporary rules are not new,
they are also not well-established, with the introduction of
leniency rules occurring just in this century, in the wake of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. While some temporary
rules adopted to date may have presented risks to investors,
others have been welcome and needed aids to market
participants.236 Still others may not be the most impactful
among temporary rules in terms of their implications for the
regulatory goals of investor protection or capital formation but
nevertheless represent a step toward modernizing how public
companies and public funds operate.
As the previous section notes regarding one such rule, the
SEC initially extended the temporary relief it adopted relating
to in-person public fund board meetings to the end of 2020.237 By
that point, most public fund boards had likely experienced at
least three quarterly board meetings using online platforms.238
Based on those experiences, it had become overwhelmingly
apparent—if doubt previously existed—that online meetings are
as effective as in-person ones in terms of voting procedures and
permitting robust discussions, full presentations of information,
236. See Clayton & Hinman, supra note 24 (explaining that the SEC’s
goals are to protect investors and market integrity).
237. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
238. This is because public fund boards of directors are expected to meet
at least quarterly. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.0-1(a)(7) (2021) (providing that a public
fund satisfies the “fund governance standards” (a defined term) if, among other
things, “[t]he disinterested directors meet at least once quarterly in a session
at which no directors who are interested persons of the fund are present”).
Most public funds comply with these governance standards because such
compliance is a condition of the funds’ reliance on certain exemptive rules
under the Investment Company Act. See, e.g., Investment Company
Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,377
(Aug. 2, 2004) (to be codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. § 270)
(amending certain exemptive rules to include compliance with the fund
governance standards as a condition). Most public funds rely on these rules.
See Gregory S. Rowland & Sarah E. Kim, USA, in PUBLIC INVESTMENT FUNDS
2020, at 120, 122 (3d ed. 2020), https://perma.cc/483L-UEVP (PDF).
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and thoughtful discussion. Not only are online meetings equally
effective, but the costs of these meetings are substantially lower,
given that funds do not need to provide reimbursements for
travel costs (which benefits fund investors because it is the fund
that pays for these travel costs) or incur a number of other
expenses.239 Temporary rules permitting SEC submissions to
occur by email, rather than physical delivery, have produced
similar benefits.240
It is plausible that the agency may decide to adopt some of
these temporary rules as permanent ones, as was recommended
by its Asset Management Advisory Committee.241 It has moved
in that direction regarding the in-person-meeting relief by
extending that rule indefinitely. Its making some rules
permanent would be welcome across significant swaths of the
public fund arena, as such permanent rules would be a measure
of regulatory recognition of the ways that technology has
enabled regulatory functions to be performed more efficiently.242
Securities market participants have largely moved beyond the
era of hard copies, physical mailings, faxes, and in-person and
telephonic communication, as evidenced by the fact that market
transactions now rely heavily on the Internet, automated
trading, and electronic communications.243 It seems appropriate
239. The author has observed this through personal experience, as she
serves on the board of directors of several public funds. These boards have had
numerous online meetings since March 2020.
240. See Division of Corporation Finance Statement Regarding
Requirements for Form 144 Paper Filings in Light of COVID-19 Concerns,
supra note 235 (allowing certain forms to be submitted via email); ARI B.
LANIN, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE: L. & PRAC. § 14.04(c) (2021) (describing the
“significant time and cost savings” resulting from online communications such
as email and other platforms).
241. See SEC ASSET MGMT. ADVISORY COMM., RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING COVID-19 OPERATIONAL ISSUES 7 (2020), https://perma.cc/2BKD5LPX (PDF) (“The AMAC recommends that the SEC issue exemptive or
interpretive relief to make permanent its existing relief from the in-person
voting requirements for mutual funds boards.”).
242. See LANIN, supra note 240 (describing the cost and time savings
resulting from the use of online platforms).
243. See 1 SEC. ARB. PROC. MANUAL § 5–6 (2020)
The explosive growth of online trading has improved the control
investors have over their portfolios. . . . Online trading has grown
rapidly, from 37 firms in 1997 to 160 firms in 1999. Over the same
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that the regulator for these participants should embrace these
technologies as well.
That suggestion may seem obvious, notwithstanding that
the SEC, as the United States’ securities regulator and primary
financial market regulator, seemingly has not sufficiently
recognized it to date. More important for present purposes, and
for this Article’s evaluation of temporary rules deployed by the
SEC in crises contexts, is that the temporary rules described
above evidence the broader potential of temporary rulemaking.
Specifically, they show how temporary rules may supply a
different, and possibly more fruitful, approach to the SEC’s
rulemaking.
At present, the SEC’s rulemaking, whether it be to amend
an existing rule or to create a new one, comprises a series of
steps occurring over several months.244 Usually, the process is
not expeditious. As a first step, the SEC produces a proposed
rule release, in which it describes the rationale for the rule
change and why it chose the particular approach that it did.245
It also sets forth the proposed text of the amended rule or new
rule.246 Importantly, another component of the proposal is an
economic analysis, in which the SEC estimates the cost of
compliance for different-sized firms and discusses any projected

period, the number of trading accounts at online broker dealers
have also increased significantly. The [General Accounting Office]
Report found that the number of accounts more than doubled from
about 4.1 million accounts in the last quarter of 1997 to nearly 10.5
million by mid-1999. There has also been a dramatic growth in the
number of average daily trades by online investors. The Report
found that in the last quarter of 1997, the number of online trades
averaged about 153,000 a day, increasing to about 500,000 trades a
day by March 1999.
244. See Reporting Threshold for Institutional Investment Managers,
Exchange Act Release No. 89,290, 85 Fed. Reg. 46,016, 46,016–20 (July 31,
2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) [hereinafter Example Rule
Proposal] (describing the SEC’s rulemaking process).
245. For an example of how the agency approaches rule proposals, see id.
(setting forth the background for the proposed rule).
246. See id. at 46,031–32. This is consistent with the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (providing that
agencies must include “either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved” in their general notice of
rulemaking).
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benefits to regulated parties, among other things.247 As required
by the Administrative Procedure Act,248 the release additionally
announces a comment period, during which potentially affected
market participants are able to provide input regarding the
proposal and, as appropriate, suggest possible changes to it.249
Finally, after the comment period has expired, the SEC
publishes a final rule release, setting forth the final rule
amendment or new rule, restating why it is necessary, and
summarizing and addressing the comments it received
regarding its proposal.250
This procedure is thorough and accords with applicable
standards and requirements.251 Nevertheless, one may
reasonably suspect that the SEC’s procedures for evaluating
whether it is appropriate to pursue formal rulemaking under
these standards and requirements is a fraught process,
impacted by the quantity and importance of competing
rulemaking priorities, as well as the natural hesitancy of an
agency that, for the most part, leans toward the conservative
rather than the adventurous.252 This is especially so with regard
247. See Example Rule Proposal, supra note 244, at 46,020–25 (setting
forth an economic analysis of the proposed rule). The agency’s inclusion of this
analysis accords with its current guidance on conducting economic analyses in
rulemaking processes. See Memorandum from RSFI and OGC on the Current
Guidance on Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking (Mar. 16, 2012),
https://perma.cc/79Q8-Z54U (PDF) (describing statutory guidance and
executive orders requiring or recommending economic analyses in rulemaking
processes).
248. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (“[T]he agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.”).
249. See Example Rule Proposal, supra note 244, at 46,024–30 (requesting
comments on questions relating to various aspects of the proposal).
250. Although the SEC has some discretion in the content of its final rule
release, the Administrative Procedure Act requires that an agency’s
announcement of a final rule or rule amendment occur at least thirty days
before it takes effect. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (“The required publication or
service of a substantive rule shall be made not less than 30 days before its
effective date . . . .”).
251. See supra notes 244–250 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., Brushan Akokar, SEC Commissioner Downplays Bitcoin
ETF Chances in 2019 Citing “Arcane” SEC Rules, COINSPEAKER (Feb. 14, 2019,
11:51 AM), perma.cc/NG9X-X6ZA (last updated Feb. 12, 2020) (referring to the
SEC as a “traditionally conservative agency”).
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to rules that constitute “background noise”—that is, that
pertain to procedures that are seemingly tangential to, or
procedural necessities of, more substantive regulatory
mandates. The requirements providing that both public
companies and public funds file certain forms and distribute
certain documents in hard copy or that certain decisions by
public fund boards of directors be made by in-person voting fall
into this category.253
This is the untapped potential of temporary rules. The SEC
can do more with temporary rulemaking than alleviate
challenging or destructive circumstances during stock market
crises. It can adopt temporary rules to allow it to better assess
actual costs and benefits of rule changes that may significantly
affect market participants but where that fact may not be
immediately evident. Temporary rules have the benefit that
they can be flexible and malleable, especially because, as the
Introduction notes, most of them are not, in fact, rules but
instead fall within a varied category of “Other Orders, Notices,
and Information.”254 As such, they generally can be discontinued
at any time.255 And because they actually guide the behavior of
market participants while they are in effect, they can produce
better data about costs (including additional risks) and benefits
than estimates developed in connection with formal rule
proposals.256
CONCLUSION
Born of recent crises significantly impacting the securities
markets, the SEC’s crisis-related temporary rules have been
largely ignored by scholars but are ripe for study. This Article
253. See Division of Corporation Finance Statement Regarding
Requirements for Form 144 Paper Filings in Light of COVID-19 Concerns,
supra note 235 (allowing forms to be submitted via email instead of in hard
copy).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 18–19.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 18–19; see also Clayton et al.,
supra note 233 (stating that the suspension of the in-person meeting
requirement “will remain in effect until it is terminated by staff action”).
256. See Clayton & Hinman, supra note 24 (stating that the SEC’s
responsive “actions have focused on facilitating market function and
preserving market integrity, as well as providing guidance and relief to market
participants affected by COVID-19”).
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constitutes a first step. Taking its analysis further presents
myriad areas for refinement and prescription to enable both
scholars and market participants to better understand not only
what risks temporary rules might present to investors, but also
what opportunities they may provide to regulated entities
struggling to survive once-in-an-era market volatility and to the
cause of more effective and more efficient regulation. It is
apparent that temporary rules are multi-faceted.
What makes temporary rules intriguing is that, to date,
they have been unusual. They have represented the efforts of an
agency that plays a critical role in the markets to try to provide
help where, in some cases, the prospect of life as normal seems
hopeless.257 The most interesting aspect of them, moreover, is
that they are a pronouncement of aspects of that hopeless world
that could most benefit not only market participants, but also
the markets themselves. They are a diagnosis of an ailment; as
such, they provide clarity and some measure of understanding.
Perhaps because, in many cases, temporary rules are
adopted at early stages based on unavoidably incomplete
information—after all, they appear only when crises
overtake—they are not perfect. Public company temporary
rules, intended to provide regulatory relief in crisis contexts,
have served to delay the dissemination of information to the
public, thereby possibly impeding the correction of
previously-made untruthful statements and extending the
period during which investors are relying on misinformation.258
Temporary rules applicable to public funds, also of the leniency
variety, have provided limited permission for fund managers to
possibly act on conflicts of interest in formulating lending
arrangements between the funds they manage and affiliated

257. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
258. See Clayton & Hinman, supra note 24
This request that companies strive to provide, and update and
supplement, as much forward-looking information as is practicable
is driven by three primary considerations: (1) the information will
benefit investors, (2) market digestion of the information will
benefit the company, and (3) the broad dissemination and exchange
of firm-specific plans for addressing the effects of COVID-19 under
various scenarios will substantially contribute to our nation’s
collective effort to fight and recover from COVID-19.
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entities.259 At the same time, some temporary rules, particularly
those that the SEC adopted amid the 2007–2009 financial crisis
to restrict short sales of the securities of financial
institutions—and, ultimately, all public companies—have
helped save vulnerable industries from falling to traders
seeking to take advantage of that vulnerability.260
Going forward, to avoid concerns similar to those associated
with the SEC’s pandemic rulemaking that this Article has
identified, the SEC should heed the lesson that arises from the
pandemic and other recent crises. During crisis conditions, not
all industries and firms should receive the same leniency,
depending on their relationship to and involvement with the
crisis at issue. In addition, not all market crises originate from
tumultuous market events, as the crises stemming from the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the 2020 pandemic
demonstrate. In short—and taking a cue from the 2007–2009
financial crisis, in which the SEC focused on the financial
industry in connection with its stringency rules—the precision
the SEC has used in formulating stringency rules is also
necessary in formulating leniency rules, perhaps especially in
the context of crises that were not caused by market events.
Still other temporary rules have been innocuous, by all
accounts. During the pandemic, for example, the SEC adopted a
temporary allowance for public fund boards of directors to meet
electronically to make decisions otherwise required to be made
during in-person meetings.261 As a result of this rule, electronic
meetings quickly became a staple for conducting business as the
pandemic raged on.262 This and other temporary rules represent
another important component of temporary rulemaking:
Temporary rules may prove to be not only necessary and
welcome in crisis circumstances, but also efficiency-enhancing
in non-crisis circumstances and, therefore, worthy of
consideration for becoming permanent rules that outlast crisis
259. See 2020 Borrowing & Lending Rule, supra note 136, at 17,374
(allowing public funds to borrow from affiliated entities).
260. See 2008 Short Sale Rule, supra note 188, at 42,379 (limiting short
sales).
261. See 2020 Board Meeting Rule, supra note 231, 17,612 (eliminating the
requirement for in-person meetings).
262. See LANIN, supra note 240 (describing the rise of virtual meetings and
platforms to facilitate corporate communications).
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conditions. More broadly, these rules show how crisis-related
temporary rules may be used as regulatory experiments that
could improve regulation in crises and beyond. Whether that
happens remains to be seen, but one hopes at least that renewed
focus on the “temporary” component of securities regulation will
inform all of the possibilities.

